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PREVENTION AND CURE
Michael Pappas*
Laws can address harms in two distinct yet intersecting ways. They
may intervene to prevent harms from occurring, or they may allow harms
to arise and then try to cure them.
Whether operating separately or in tandem, prevention and cure
approaches pervade laws, policies, and individual actions. A landlord
may exercise prevention via a “no pets” policy, or she may opt for cure
by requiring pet owners to pay a damage deposit and cleaning fee.
Alternatively, a combination of prevention and cure governs motorist
behavior. Speed limits seek to prevent accidents while negligence
liability provides compensation for accident victims. Further, climatechange policies seek to prevent climate-impacts by curtailing
greenhouse-gas emissions, and they attempt to cure climate-harms via
disaster assistance.
Prevention and cure are ubiquitous, but their features and
relationship are underexplored. This Article changes that. It investigates
prevention and cure to provide a novel framework for assessing and
enhancing the structure of law and policy. This informs policy design
across a range of substantive areas. It identifies situations that counsel
predominant prevention or cure approaches, and it uncovers mutually
reinforcing prevention-and-cure combinations. Further, the Article
applies the prevention-and-cure framework to explain and critique policy
domains ranging from motorist behavior to climate change. This
perspective particularly illuminates how the various legal and policy
responses to climate change interrelate, and how they miss opportunities
to align complementary prevention and cure measures. It identifies how
relatively small structural changes can conjoin seemingly disparate
climate-change regulations, liabilities, programs, and precautions into a
cohesive policy landscape.
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research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
When do we want a rule of “don’t touch” and when do we want
“you break it, you buy it”? When “do not enter” and when “leave it
like you found it”? When “no dogs” and when “pet deposit plus
cleaning fee”? Put another way, when should we prevent harms,
avoiding them at the cost of foreclosed opportunity, and when should
we let actions proceed relatively unconstrained, seeking to cure
problems that arise?
Prevention and cure approaches pervade both private behavior
and public and private law. Most basically, prevention seeks to avoid
harms, and cure seeks to remedy harms. This Article contends that
prevention and cure are foundational concepts for law and policy, and
that appreciating structures of prevention and cure can explain and
improve law across numerous substantive areas.
Consider a few contemporary examples. Should policies
drastically curtail greenhouse gas emissions to avert the harms of
climate change, or should emissions persist as they may, with society
reacting to climate impacts that arise? Should some speech be
restricted, or should all speech be free of limitations other than liability
for damages? Should breakthrough pharmaceuticals hit markets
immediately, or should they be unavailable until approved? Should
land development be governed by planning and zoning laws, or should
courts just resolve conflicts as needed? Should internet platforms
screen user-uploaded content for copyright violations, or should they
simply take down infringing material upon notice from a copyright
holder? These debates sound in different fields, but underlying them
all is the choice among prevention and cure strategies.
From parenting decisions to policy preferences, the preventionand-cure framework applies broadly. Indeed, ideological divides often
track inclinations toward prevention or cure. For instance, arguments
(typically from the political left) for urban planning, pollution control,
consumer protection, and regulatory oversight appear to embrace the
idiom that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”1
1. See An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/anounceofpreventionisworthapoundofcure
(last
visited June 4, 2021) (describing the idiom). For examples of arguments that appear to embrace the
idiom, see, e.g., Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 897, 910–11; Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental
Regulation Does that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 589 (2002).
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Alternately, arguments (typically from the political right) for
deregulation,2 entrepreneurial opportunity, cutting red tape, and
limiting government embrace an “I’ll clean up after myself” (or,
possibly, “better to ask forgiveness than permission”) approach rooted
in cure.
To crystalize the distinction between prevention and cure,
imagine two extreme policies. First, consider a pure prevention
regime. This would constrain all potentially harm-causing behavior
and would avoid many harms. However, it would almost surely fail to
contain all antisocial behavior, and it would foreclose much
potentially beneficial activity.3
Alternatively, consider an extreme cure regime. It would impose
no limits on behavior, maximizing autonomy to act, but it would
require that any resulting harms be remedied.4 The prospect of cure
obligations would incentivize actors to take some precautions, but
invariably some irreparable harms would arise.
These hypotheticals showcase the divergence between prevention
and cure as well as their respective limitations, illustrating why
prevention and cure approaches rarely operate in isolation. While
individual prevention and cure measures can sometimes be substitutes,
policy structures typically combine complementary prevention and
cure approaches. Thus, revisiting the question “when do we want a
rule of ‘don’t touch’ and when do we want ‘you break it, you buy it,’”
most often we will want to deploy elements of both. This Article
details when and how laws can do so.
By building the conceptual framework of prevention and cure, the
Article illuminates the core architecture of law and policy, providing
both descriptive and prescriptive insights. Descriptively, the Article
exposes recurrent structures of prevention and cure that underlie legal
doctrines across diverse substantive areas. Using the prevention-andcure framework, the Article explains a sweeping range of common2. See, e.g., Barak Y. Orbach, The New Regulatory Era—An Introduction, 51 ARIZ. L. REV.
559, 559 (2009) (explaining changes in political attitudes towards regulation following the 2008
financial crisis).
3. Cf. David Fouse, Do Public Heath Protections Infringe on Freedoms?, PUB. HEALTH
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 21, 2011, 4:18 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20180821110740/http://
www.publichealthnewswire.org/?p=1630 (describing the tension between public health regulations
and personal freedom).
4. See Catherine A. Hardee, Considering Consequences: Autonomy’s Missing Half, 43 PEPP.
L. REV. 785, 788 (2016).
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law, statutory, and constitutional principles. For instance, among
many other examples, the Article clarifies climate change law and
policy, applying the framework to make sense of major climate change
litigation and regulation, elucidate key differences in cap-and-trade
and carbon-tax policies, and uncover connections between disaster
assistance and tort liability. Moreover, the prevention-and-cure
framework offers a structure to understand not only individual legal
approaches but also relationships among policies. Accordingly, the
Article analytically (and graphically) maps interlinked policy
landscapes surrounding climate change and other policy contexts.
Prescriptively, the prevention-and-cure framework helps enhance
policy design. It identifies scenarios suggesting predominant
prevention or cure approaches, and it recommends effective
combinations of prevention and cure. Further, it diagnoses structural
policy gaps where prevention and cure measures fail to reinforce each
other. For example, it illuminates how the various legal and policy
responses to climate change interrelate, and how they miss
opportunities to align complementary prevention and cure measures.
Further, it reveals relatively small structural changes that can knit
seemingly disparate climate change regulations, liabilities, programs,
and precautions into a cohesive policy landscape. Through this and
other applications, the prevention-and-cure framework offers a
theoretical and practical lens to explain, critique, and improve law and
policy.
Additionally, the prevention-and-cure framework advances
multiple strains of academic literature. It bridges legal philosophy,5
law and economics,6 and numerous public- and private-law doctrines,
including tort, property, contract, constitutional law, and
environmental law. It also weaves together prominent lines of
scholarship addressing the relationship of risk and harm,7 the roles of

5. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 184 (2008).
6. See, e.g., Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, Modelling the Choice Between Regulation
and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare, 37 CANADIAN J. ECON. 590, 590–612 (2004).
7. See, e.g., ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 103–10
(2001); Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 257
(1993); Nuno Garoupa & Marie Obidzinski, The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of
Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions 1–17 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Res., Discussion Paper No. 5899,
2006).
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private liability and public regulation,8 and the deployment of property
rules and liability rules.9
Finally, the prevention-and-cure framework makes novel
contributions through its expansive scope. Building on prior
scholarship that focused primarily on tort and property law,10 this
framework transcends substantive legal domains. Moreover, this
breadth comes with depth. The Article considers multiple policydesign variables, both individually and in combination, yielding a
more expansive model and more refined observations than did prior
work.11 Additionally, whereas previous literature offered relatively
static comparisons of binary regimes,12 this Article provides dynamic
analysis of how different policy choices compare, interconnect, and
feedback upon each other. Finally, the Article incorporates a plurality
of values into the prevention-and-cure framework, making it adaptable
to a variety of normative commitments beyond the primarily utilitarian
focus of previous analyses.13
Structurally, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I establishes the
prevention-and-cure framework. It outlines the basic distinction, and
it surveys diverse examples of prevention and cure approaches. It also
highlights key interrelations between prevention and cure.
Part II considers how different normative values influence
preferences for prevention and cure. It expounds how positivist,
utilitarian, natural rights, and distributive justice commitments
generate competing conceptions of “harm,” and it identifies scenarios
that call for predominant prevention or cure strategies.
Next, Part III examines the practical limitations of prevention and
cure. It surveys how prevention and cure measures may be either over-

8. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 357 (1984); Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice
Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 193–211 (1977).
9. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 71
(1996).
10. See supra notes 7–9.
11. Earlier related work typically considered binary policy regimes along an individual
dimension, for example juxtaposing public regulation and private liability. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
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inclusive or under-inclusive and how this may frustrate various
normative commitments.
Finally, Part IV provides insights for designing integrated
prevention and cure strategies. It explores variations of prevention and
cure, such as 1) internal or external implementation, 2) property-rule
or liability-rule enforcement, 3) ex-ante or ex-post timing, and 4)
actor-presumption or victim-presumption. It also details how
particular complementary prevention and cure measures can combine
to advance policy goals. Finally, it examines how multiple prevention
and cure measures can assemble into interconnected policy
landscapes, and it applies these insights to explain and critique policies
addressing motorist behavior and climate change. Through this
application, Part IV demonstrates how disjointed prevention and cure
measures inhibit climate change policy goals, and it suggests how
expanding particular cure variations can reinforce climate-policy
efforts.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING PREVENTION AND CURE
Prevention and cure are trans-substantive14 approaches for
addressing harm.15 Prevention tries to avoid harms, and cure attempts
to remedy them. While the two approaches interrelate,16 they are
nonetheless conceptually distinct. This Part outlines the basic binary
of prevention and cure, essentializing them to highlight core aspects
and to underpin subsequent analysis of their nuances. It also applies
the prevention-and-cure framework to explain legal doctrines and
economic principles. Finally, it discusses key interrelations between
prevention and cure.
A. The Basic Prevention and Cure Distinction
Prevention approaches are actions, interventions, or choices that
seek to avoid harm. Prevention may be private or public. For instance,
prevention may include precautionary actions (e.g., signs warning of
a slippery floor), prohibitions on actions (e.g., laws against drunk
14. “Trans-substantive” refers to a discernible concept that remains consistent across a variety
of substantive areas. See David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law,
2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1197.
15. For a discussion of the concept of harm, see infra Part II.
16. See infra discussion Section I.A.
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driving), or conditions on actions (e.g., requirements for construction
permits). The defining feature of prevention is an attempt to direct
behavior to avoid negative impacts. Thus, prevention focuses centrally
on behavior or action.
Alternatively, cure approaches are efforts to remedy harms, and
cure too can be private or public. Frequently cure approaches place
remedial obligations on actors who cause harms. For example,
negligent drivers who cause automobile accidents face liability.
However, as a conceptual matter, cure approaches need not track
causation. For example, hospitals offering emergency services must
treat harms they did not cause and must provide care even if neither
the harm-causing party nor the injured party can pay.17 Some cure
arrangements even have victims provide their own remedies,
essentially letting harms fall where they may.18
This reveals the fundamental aspect of cure: it simply reacts to
harms. While linking cure obligations to harm causation may comport
with notions of justice or create desirable incentives, cure itself has no
inherent commitment to causation or avoidance. Thus, whereas
prevention focuses centrally on directing behavior or action, cure
focuses centrally on handling the result or damage. This key
distinction separates prevention and cure and underpins this Article’s
analytical framework.
B. Prevention and Cure in Doctrines, Policies, and Economic
Principles
The prevention-and-cure framework exposes recurrent, transsubstantive structures in legal doctrines, policy configurations, and
economic principles. This helps explain individual doctrines, doctrinal
interplay, and policy landscapes. It also allows insights from one area
of law to inform seemingly unrelated legal contexts.
1. Doctrines and Policies
The prevention-and-cure framing elucidates individual doctrines,
doctrinal complements and substitutes, and broad policy approaches.
17. See, e.g., Emergency Medical Treatment & Labor Act, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/regulations-and-guidance/legislation/emtala/ (last modified Mar. 4,
2021, 11:59 AM).
18. See infra Section IV.A.1.b for a discussion of external cure.
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First, attention to prevention and cure regimes reveals
nonintuitive links among common-law, constitutional-law, statutory,
and regulatory doctrines. For instance, the doctrine of negligence
embodies a cure approach. Individuals may act as they will, but they
must remedy harms caused by unreasonable behavior. The doctrine of
nuisance is similar. Individuals have latitude to use property, but when
conflicts arise, courts assess relative rights and order remedies for
harms. Additionally, eminent domain and regulatory takings doctrines
reflect constitutional cure approaches. Both doctrines authorize broad
government action but require compensation for incursions on private
property rights. Statutory and regulatory regimes also employ cure
strategies. For example, Clean Water Act regulations use offsets to
cure environmental harms; they maintain “no net loss” of wetlands by
requiring an entity destroying wetlands to create or restore other
wetlands.19
Prevention approaches too span common law, constitutional law,
statutes, and regulations.20 As a broad example, criminal laws
frequently proscribe certain behavior (e.g., theft) to avoid harms.
Additionally, trespass doctrines foreclose unpermitted entry onto
property to prevent physical or dignitary harms. Further, the commonlaw standard for issuing injunctions seeks to avoid irreparable harms.
Numerous constitutional provisions also adopt prevention approaches.
Article I, Section 10 directs “No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation,” and this forbids behavior that might harm
the union or interfere with federal foreign affairs powers.21 Similarly,
Eleventh Amendment immunity prevents individuals from suing
states, absent the state’s consent, to avoid harms to sovereignty.22
Some constitutional doctrines even prevent acts of prevention. For
example, the presumptive unconstitutionality of “prior restraints” on
speech23 guards against harm to the free press24 by limiting
19. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2018).
20. Cf. Philip M. Nichols, The Good Bribe, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 647, 660–61 (2015)
(explaining different academic approaches to prevention).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
22. See generally Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (discussing the history of Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
23. See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Ariel L. Bendor, Prior
Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 291
(1999).
24. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 719–20 (1931).
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government censorship power. Finally, prevention abounds in
legislation and regulation. The Clean Water Act prohibits unpermitted
pollution of navigable waters,25 the 1958 Federal Switchblade Act
prohibits interstate travel with automatic knives,26 a Louisiana law
prohibits taking white or albino alligators from the wild,27 and a
federal regulation requires hair nets and beard covers in certain foodmanufacturing contexts.28 All of these restrict behaviors to prevent an
array of harms.
The prevention-and-cure framework also accentuates doctrinal
complements and substitutes. For instance, laws address potential
harms from motorist behavior by blending prevention and cure
approaches. Prohibitions on drunk driving and speeding represent
straightforward prevention approaches. Laws disallow these behaviors
to avoid harms. Concurrently, tort liability for accidents represents a
cure approach. Much driving proceeds with relatively little external
constraint, and when accidents invariably occur, injured parties turn to
tort liability29 and automotive insurance30 for remedies.
Alternately, the contract doctrines of specific performance and
efficient breach exemplify prevention and cure operating as
substitutes. Specific performance adopts a prevention approach by
enforcing a contract to “assure[] that the contractual duty is
performed.”31 This directs behavior to avoid the harm of breach by
precluding the breach altogether.
Conversely, efficient breach exemplifies cure.32 The doctrine
holds that a party may breach a contract if all parties would be no
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2018).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1242 (2018).
27. LA. STAT. ANN. § 56:280 (West, Westlaw through the 2020 Second Extraordinary Sess.).
28. 21 C.F.R. § 110.10(b)(6) (2019).
29. Typically, tort liability exemplifies ex-post cure. See infra Section IV.C.1.b.
30. Automotive insurance itself provides ex-post cure, but laws mandating that drivers carry
automotive insurance are a form of ex-ante cure similar to security deposits. See infra Section
IV.C.1.b.
31. See Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract 7 (John
M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus. Discussion Paper, Paper No. 532, 2005), http://www.law.harva
rd.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Shavell_532.pdf.
32. The principle of efficient breach provides an example, but some commentators suggest
that efficient breach is rarely found in practice. See, e.g., Roger B. Dworkin, The Process
Paradigm: Rethinking Medical Malpractice, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 513 (2006); D. Daniel
Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition
Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 250 n.83 (2008). However,
other scholars maintain that even if cases do not label doctrinal rulings as efficient breach per se,
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worse off (i.e., if the breaching party pays full expectancy damages).33
For instance, imagine Actor contracts with Victim to supply a product
worth $100 to Victim (i.e., expectancy damages are $100). Then
Better Price offers to buy Actor’s product for $210. Actor could breach
the contract with Victim, pay Victim $100, sell to Better Price for
$210, and net $110. Under these facts, all parties are as well off (or
better) if the breach occurs because Actor will completely remedy the
legally recognized harm to Victim.34 By allowing the breach, subject
to compensation, efficient breach embraces cure.
Depending on context, contract law deploys either prevention via
specific performance (e.g., requiring delivery of unique goods) or cure
via efficient breach (e.g., requiring expectancy damages for fungible
goods).
Finally, the prevention-and-cure framework clarifies major
policy approaches, such as overarching responses to climate change.
One policy avenue, termed “climate mitigation,” seeks to avoid
climate change harms by, for example, reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. This represents prevention. Another policy direction,
termed “climate adaptation,” focuses on navigating the impacts of
climate change—for example, by relocating communities or
modifying infrastructure to cope with sea level rise. This tracks cure.
2. Economic Principles
The prevention-and-cure framework also illuminates the two
standard metrics of economic efficiency, Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks,
which inform policy analysis and design. Evaluating efficiency under
the Pareto standard reflects a prevention approach, whereas adopting
the Kaldor-Hicks standard tends toward cure.
The Pareto standard asks if a change from the status quo makes
one party better off while making no one else worse off. If so, the
change is “Pareto superior.”35 This standard resonates with prevention

the prevalence of expectancy damages represent de facto practice of the efficient breach. See
MAXWELL L. STEARNS ET AL., LAW AND ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 74 (2018).
33. See, e.g., Efficient Breach, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/efficient
_breach (last visited Apr. 11, 2021); STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32.
34. See generally Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE
L.J. 568 (2006) (discussing utilitarian and moral aspects of efficient breach).
35. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 20.
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because it avoids harms, protecting individuals at the expense of
foregone opportunity.
Alternatively, the Kaldor-Hicks standard considers a change
efficient if it produces more benefits than it does costs, even if the
change leaves some parties worse off.36 Rather than focusing on
individuals, as the Pareto standard does, the Kaldor-Hicks approach
adopts a societal cost-benefit analysis.37 It reasons that if aggregate
gains exceed aggregate losses, society benefits because gaining parties
could compensate losing parties (even if they do not actually do so).38
In this way, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency shares underpinnings with
cure. Both Kaldor-Hicks and cure allow behavior to proceed based on
presumptions that harms can be remedied. Additionally, Kaldor-Hicks
and cure both disassociate remedial obligations from causation:
Kaldor-Hicks imposes no actual remedial burdens at all, and cure
regimes need not link remedial duties with causes of harm.
The prevention-and-cure framework helps distill the respective
commitments of the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks approaches. The
Kaldor-Hicks standard uses cure concepts to justify exposing
individuals to harms (e.g., involuntary transfers39) in pursuit of
collective social advances. Conversely, the preventive Pareto standard
protects individuals from harm, even at the expense of thwarting
potential social benefits.40
C. Interplay Between Prevention and Cure
The previous sections outlined the defining distinctions between
prevention and cure. This section describes two important ways that
they interrelate: 1) cure obligations create incentives for prevention,
and 2) since prevention efforts cannot eliminate harms, they leave
room for cure.
First, cure incentivizes prevention. Actors frequently avoid harms
to obviate the costs of cure. Indeed, economic analysis of tort law has
long suggested that the prospect of liability (i.e., cure) leads actors to

36. Id. at 21.
37. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 165, 170 (1999).
38. See, e.g., id. at 190.
39. See, e.g., id. at 170.
40. STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 20–21; Adler & Posner, supra note 37, at 188.
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invest in cost-effective precautions (i.e., prevention).41 For example,
concern over tort liability may lead the owner of a swimming pool to
build a precautionary fence around the pool.
Additionally, prevention leaves room for cure because prevention
measures cannot completely eliminate harms. Indeed, attempts to do
so would be costly and futile.42 Even focused, effective prevention
efforts will not result in full compliance. As long as there is driving,
there will likely be some drunk driving. Additionally, because of
residual risk, some harms are essentially unpreventable. Some car
crashes will occur despite safe driving; some well-made, properlyused products will malfunction; and some workers will be hurt even
at safe jobsites. Cure is the only option to address such unpreventable
harms.43
These connections between prevention and cure are enormously
important for policy design, and subsequent sections address them in
more detail.
II. PREVENTION AND CURE ACROSS DIVERSE VALUES
The prevention-and-cure framework transcends not only different
substantive contexts but also diverse values. This Part examines how
differing normative commitments generate competing conceptions of
“harm,” which in turn yield different preferences for prevention and
cure approaches. It also identifies scenarios that call for predominant
prevention or cure strategies.
A. Normative Commitments and Conceptions of Harm
Laws and policies rely on prevention and cure structures to
address harms. This necessitates some underlying concept of “harm”
to guide the deployment of prevention or cure approaches. However,
ideas of harm are unfixed and inherently contestable. As philosopher
Joel Feinberg observed, “harm” may represent a nonnormative, valueneutral “setback to interests,” or it may represent a normative

41. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 73–78; Shavell, supra note 8.
42. Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance,
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 93
(1989) (explaining the impossibility of eliminating health and safety risks ).
43. Cf. id. (citing cure via compensation as an “important social objective”).
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“wrong.”44 Either way, harm takes shape only in relation to the
interests that are “setback” or the values that are “wronged.”45
This section surveys how influential normative commitments
shape notions of harm. It considers how positivist, utilitarian, natural
rights,46 and distributive justice perspectives yield particular
conceptions of harm. It also analyzes how these ideas of harm
influence prevention and cure approaches by applying them to
examples of eminent domain, drunk driving, and climate change.
1. Positivism
Positivism roots the legitimacy of laws in social authorities (e.g.,
legislatures) rather than in background morals or principles.47 For a
positivist, any law duly enacted by a recognized authority is valid.48
Thus, positivism exalts process49 and typically defers to lawmaking
bodies. However, positivism need not entail rubberstamping,
particularly in the face of political-process dysfunctions. Rather,
positivist commitments can accommodate concerns over interestgroup influence and rent seeking.50
The concept of harm, from a positivist perspective, also centers
on duly enacted laws. Legal proscriptions and liabilities define harms
and determine the prevention and cure measures to address such
harms.

44. See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 31
(1987).
45. Cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 114 (1999) (explaining historical change in attitudes toward harm).
46. This Article adopts the term “natural rights” to include what is commonly conceived of as
“natural law,” with its religious-based morality roots, as well as more secular conceptions of
morality. See generally Eduardo M. Peñalver, Restoring the Right Constitution?, 116 YALE L.J.
732, 737–49 (2007) (providing the history of natural law theory); George, supra note 5 (analyzing
natural law theories through a lens of morality).
47. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185–86 (2d ed. 1994); see also Michael
Baur, Beyond Standard Legal Positivism and “Aggressive” Natural Law: Some Thoughts on Judge
O’Scannlain’s “Third Way,” 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1538–39 (2011) (arguing that positivism
flows from natural law).
48. Cf. Baur, supra note 47, at 1529–30 (explaining that legal positivism recognizes a law’s
validity through social facts or conventions, not norms or moral principles).
49. See, e.g., Randolph Marshall Collins, The Constitutionality of Flag Burning: Can Neutral
Values Protect First Amendment Principles?, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 887, 894 (1991); William N.
Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1014 (1989).
50. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the
Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 459–63 (1992).
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To illustrate positivist conceptions of harm and their implications
for prevention and cure, consider examples of eminent domain, drunk
driving, and climate change.
First, imagine an exercise of eminent domain to condemn
Owner’s home. Further, imagine that Owner subjectively values her
home well above its market value and that she disagrees with the
condemnation’s purpose. From a positivist perspective, no harm arises
as long as the government pays Owner fair market value and the
condemnation fits the legal definition of “public use.” This is because
the Fifth Amendment allows condemnation for public use if just
compensation (i.e., market value) is paid.51 So, even though Owner
suffers subjective losses and believes the condemnation illegitimate,
no legally cognizable (i.e., positivist) harm arises.
Alternatively, a positivist harm would arise if the condemnation
contravened the Fifth Amendment, either by lacking a public-use
justification or failing to provide just compensation.52 To address such
harm, positivism would prescribe either prevention or cure, depending
on the relevant law. In this case, Fifth Amendment doctrine would
invalidate (i.e., prevent) a condemnation that lacks a public-use
justification. However, it would order payment (i.e., cure) for a
condemnation that fails to provide just compensation.
Moving to the example of drunk driving, because it is illegal, the
act of drunk driving itself constitutes a positivist harm, regardless of
whether physical injury results. Moreover, laws address this harm
through both prevention (e.g., prohibitions and fines) and cure (e.g.,
negligence per se and dram shop liability). Absent the prohibitions and
liabilities particular to drunk driving, the action itself would not
constitute a positivist harm.
Finally, in the context of climate change, positivism explains the
divergent results in the two Supreme Court cases regarding
greenhouse gas emissions, Massachusetts v. EPA53 and American
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut.54 In both cases, plaintiffs asserted
harms from unchecked emissions, and the Court decided both cases

51.
52.
53.
54.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Id.
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
564 U.S. 410 (2011) [hereinafter AEP].
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through positivist application of the Clean Air Act (CAA).55 In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court found unregulated greenhouse gas
emissions were a harm because the CAA required EPA to address such
emissions.56 The Court prevented57 further harm by ordering EPA to
comply with the CAA.58 Conversely, in AEP v. Connecticut, the Court
held that unregulated greenhouse gas emissions could not constitute a
public-nuisance harm because the CAA displaced such common-law
claims.59 In both cases, positivist statutory application determined
whether unregulated emissions were a cognizable harm.60
2. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism seeks to maximize social welfare61 by achieving
“the greatest amount of good for the greatest number.”62 To do so,
utilitarian analysis weighs all the costs and benefits (broadly defined)
of policy options and pursues the course that yields the greatest net
benefit. To compare dissimilar costs and benefits,63 utilitarianism
requires some universal metric, and economic measures typically
serve as the common currency. Thus, economic analysis is a primary
evaluative tool for utilitarianism.64
Harm, to a utilitarian, is any cost that detracts from social
welfare.65 This means that utilitarian conceptions of harm can extend
55. EPA, 549 U.S. at 505; AEP, 564 U.S. at 418–20.
56. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532.
57. This is an example of ex-post prevention, addressed further infra Section IV.A.3.a.
58. EPA, 549 U.S. at 535.
59. AEP, 564 U.S. at 420–23.
60. Id. at 425; EPA, 549 U.S. at 528.
61. Though utilitarianism and positivism are often associated, utilitarianism is outcome-driven
whereas positivism is agnostic towards laws’ impacts. See, e.g., Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics
Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901, 914–15 (1995)
(discussing the links between positivism and utilitarianism).
62. Julia Driver, The History of Utilitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 22, 2014),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/.
63. For a discussion of the difficulty in determining comparative utilitarian benefit, see Adler
& Posner, supra note 37.
64. Cf., e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 4 (6th ed. 2012)
(providing an overview of the impact of economics on the analysis and practice of law); Avery
Wiener Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2239
(1996) (describing the influence of economics on the law); Jules L. Coleman, Crimes and
Transactions, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 921, 927 (2000) (explaining the relationship between economics
and criminality).
65. Cf. Driver, supra note 62 (explaining that the focus of utilitarianism is to “maximize the
overall good”).
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beyond positivist ones. For instance, utilitarian analysis views
subjective and intangible losses as harms, even if such losses are not
legally recognized harms.66
Utilitarianism addresses harms differently at the individual and
social level. Utilitarianism seeks to avoid (i.e. prevent) harms to net
social welfare, even if that means allowing some particular individual
harms. The justification is that the overall social benefit offsets (i.e.
cures) the individual harms.67 Accordingly, to a utilitarian, the choice
between prevention and cure regimes is necessarily an empirical
question.68
Revisiting the examples of eminent domain, drunk driving, and
climate change helps explain. First, recall the hypothetical eminentdomain condemnation of Owner’s home, and recall that Owner
subjectively values her home above its market value. From a utilitarian
perspective, the homeowner’s loss of subjective value is a harm.
However, the utilitarian response to this harm depends on a
broader measurement of social welfare. For instance, imagine that the
condemnation is to build a lightly trafficked highway that will also
require condemnation of other homes.69 If the aggregate costs (all
homeowners’ subjective losses plus highway construction costs)
outweigh the aggregate benefits (a little-used highway), the
condemnation causes net social harm. Utilitarian analysis calls for
preventing the condemnations and highway project.
Alternatively, imagine that the highway would benefit many
people and would require only the condemnation of Owner’s home. If
the highway’s aggregate benefits now exceed its costs (Owner’s
subjective losses plus highway construction costs), the condemnation
66. Utilitarian conceptions of harm may also be narrower than positivist ones, such as when
positive law identifies a harm in a scenario that utilitarianism views as merely distributional. For
example, if a law requires that an insurance company cover certain losses, but the insurance
company refuses to pay the policyholder for such losses, then the policyholder has suffered a harm
in a positivist sense but not necessarily in a utilitarian sense. From a utilitarian standpoint, unless
the payment impacts net social welfare, then the issue is merely distributional and creates no social
harm.
67. See supra discussion Section I.B.2.
68. Utilitarian analysis should also consider the costs of administering different combinations
of prevention and cure approaches.
69. Baltimore’s “road to nowhere” serves as an unfortunate example of such a project. See
Johnny Miller, Roads to Nowhere: How Infrastructure Built on American Inequality, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 23, 2018, 10:27 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/feb/21/roads-nowhereinfrastructure-american-inequality.
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represents a net social gain. Here, utilitarianism supports the
condemnation and considers the net benefits to effectively cure
Owner’s harms.
Crucially, in both scenarios, Owner’s harms are identical.
However, the utilitarian response to these harms, whether via
prevention or cure, varies based on the social welfare context.
Moving to the example of drunk driving, such behavior represents
a utilitarian harm only when it decreases social welfare. Thus,
utilitarianism would prevent drunk driving to an optimal point where
the aggregate costs (broadly defined) of both drunk driving and its
prevention efforts are lowest. At that point, some drunk driving would
likely still occur, but utilitarian analysis would not consider those
instances a social harm because eliminating them would be costlier
than allowing them.
Finally, utilitarian analysis of climate change asks whether
greenhouse gas emissions cause net losses or net gains, and empirical
disagreement over this question causes major climate-policy
divergence. If, as some prominent economists argue, climate change
costs outweigh the benefits of current greenhouse gas emissions, then
climate change is a social harm.70 Accordingly, utilitarianism suggests
preventing the harm by reducing emissions to the point where their
benefits exceed projected climate change costs. Proposed climate
policies like the Waxman-Markey Bill71 and the Obama-era Clean
Power Plan72 generally followed this utilitarian approach. Both aimed
to eliminate lower-value emissions to reduce climate change costs
while retaining the greatest benefits from remaining emissions.
However, if, as some economists assume, the benefits of current
emissions outstrip climate change costs,73 then utilitarian analysis
suggests development gains are worth climate impacts.74 If so,
70. See, e.g., Expert Report of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Ph.D. at 7, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15cv-01517-TC (D. Or. June 28, 2018), https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blog/document_cw_01-2.pdf.
71. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009).
72. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: CUTTING CARBON
POLLUTION FROM POWER PLANTS, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/201508/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
73. Matthew Rendall, Discounting, Climate Change, and the Ecological Fallacy, 129 ETHICS
441, 444 (2019) (“Economists commonly assume that economic growth will leave future
generations richer than the present one, in spite of climate change.”).
74. But see id. at 444–45 (criticizing this premise).
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emission reductions are unwarranted because enhanced social welfare
theoretically cures climate-related losses. Under these assumptions,
utilitarianism supports Trump Administration policies that minimally
restrict emissions75 or bypass climate change analysis76 in pursuit of
economic growth.
Though seemingly antithetical, the divergent emissions policies
described above share consistent utilitarian concepts of harm and
criteria for deploying prevention or cure. The policy differences
manifest from conflicting estimates of aggregate costs and benefits.
3. Natural Rights
From a natural rights perspective, laws must comport with
principles of morality, right action, or justice. Procedures alone cannot
legitimize laws, as with positivism, nor are all values fungible in
pursuit of social welfare, as with utilitarianism.77 Rather, a natural
rights approach holds that valid laws must adhere to certain essential
normative standards.78
This section focuses on particular natural rights commitments to
individual liberty and autonomy, which emerge as common themes
across diverse natural rights theories.79 Such concepts of liberty and
autonomy are considered essential to “integral human fulfillment”80
because they entail “the capacity to be one’s own person, to live one’s
life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s own and
not the product of manipulative or distorting external forces.”81
Further, these liberty and autonomy values are inclusive,
75. Dallas Burtraw & Amelia Keyes, 10 Big Little Flaws in EPA’s Affordable Clean Energy
Rule, RES. FOR THE FUTURE (July 22, 2019), https://www.rff.org/publications/issue-briefs/10-biglittle-flaws-in-epas-affordable-clean-energy-rule/.
76. Lisa Friedman, Trump Rule Would Exclude Climate Change in Infrastructure Planning,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/climate/trump-nepa-climatechange.html.
77. Cf. George, supra note 5, at 184 (explaining that natural law is fundamentally concerned
with incommensurable “basic human goods”).
78. Cf. Adler & Posner, supra note 37, at 171 (discussing a cost-benefit analysis approach to
crafting regulations).
79. See James Donato, Note, Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal Interpretation, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1517, 1517 (1988) (noting that natural rights theories can be rooted in sources ranging from
god and nature to secular “history and community structure”).
80. George, supra note 5, at 172.
81. John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (June 29, 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral; see JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 371–74 (1988).
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encompassing both potential actors’ “freedom to” act and potential
victims’ “freedom from” subjugation.82
Given natural rights’ commitments to liberty, a natural rights
harm is any undue incursion on liberty. As for what constitutes an
undue incursion, that depends on one’s underlying concept of
autonomy, and two influential moral-political theories offer prominent
standards for measuring natural rights harm. These theories are the
“neutralist” and “legal moralist” approaches.83
Under the neutralist approach,84 a harm to the liberty of potential
actors arises from any state coercion that constrains behavior absent
injury to others.85 Further, a harm to the liberty of potential victims
arises from any behavior that actually causes injury.86
Alternatively, from a legal moralist perspective, harms to the
liberty of potential victims (including individuals or society at large)
arise when actions transgress moral principles.87 In such cases, the
“wrong”88 or “sin”89 constitutes a harm even in the absence of
identifiable injury to others.90 Harms to the liberty of potential actors
occur only when moral action is foreclosed.
Though neutralists and legal moralists identify harms differently,
both approaches, and natural rights perspectives in general, address
harms similarly. They embrace prevention and eschew cure.
Legal moralist perspectives adopt prevention both to ensure
moral behavior (protecting potential victims) and to enable choices
within moral bounds (protecting potential actors).91 For example,
Robert George has offered legal moralist arguments both for laws
82. Cf. Christman, supra note 81 (explaining that “[p]ersonal (or individual) autonomy should
also be distinguished from freedom”).
83. Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 599, 662 (2000).
84. Id. at 666.
85. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68–69 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974)
(1859). See Gorsuch, supra note 83, at 662, 666; Harcourt, supra note 45, at 109, 110, 131.
86. MILL, supra note 85, at 68–69. See Gorsuch, supra note 83, at 666; Harcourt, supra note
45, at 131.
87. See Harcourt, supra note 45, at 116–25.
88. See FEINBERG, supra note 44, at 34.
89. Harcourt, supra note 45, at 125 (quoting Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in
The Enforcement of Morals 22 (1965)).
90. See Gorsuch, supra note 83, at 667–70.
91. See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 45, at 173–75; Robert P. George, Ruling to Serve: A
Fundamental Argument for Limited Government, FIRST THINGS (Apr. 2013),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2013/04/ruling-to-serve.
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suppressing pornography92 (i.e. preventing wrongs) and against laws
mandating sex education for children (i.e. preventing limitations on
acceptable behavior).93
Neutralists also employ prevention, both to protect potential
actors from government oppression and to protect potential victims
from identifiable harms.94 For instance, neutralism welcomes policies
disallowing censorship or prohibiting assault. However, as prevention
measures become more attenuated from actual harm, they risk
breaching neutralist principles.95 For example, a prohibition on
transporting automatic knives96 violates neutralist tenets because it
proscribes action that causes no injury.
Unlike prevention, cure grates with natural rights principles,
whether legal-moralist, neutralist, or otherwise. While cure may
appear to protect both potential actors (by limiting behavioral
constraints) and victims (through the prospect of remedy), cure
fundamentally contradicts natural rights commitments to autonomy by
forcing harmed parties into involuntary exchanges of rights.
Cure, by its nature, imposes a transactional relationship and
plunges parties into a market. In a cure scenario, the occurrence of
harm compels an exchange between the harmer and harmed. Both
parties must join the relationship, but only the harmer has the agency
to initiate it (by causing the harm). So even if the harmed can choose
her price,97 which is not guaranteed,98 the forced transaction gives
harmers excessive liberty at the expense of the harmed.99 This

92. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
MORALITY 188 (1993).
93. See, e.g., Robert P. George, 2018 President’s Essay: Returning to Our Principles,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 25, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/article/2018-presidents-essayreturning-our-principles.
94. MILL, supra note 85, at 68–69 (Mill’s harm principle expressly recognizes that “power
can be rightfully exercised . . . to prevent harm to others.” (emphasis added)).
95. See id. at 149. For a survey of literature on “risks that fail to materialize as harms,” see
Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1403 n.6 (2007).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 1242 (2018).
97. See infra Section IV.A.2. Cf. Coleman, supra note 64, at 924 (explaining that criminal
conduct constitutes an illegitimate transaction because the actor asserts an authority he does not
possess).
98. See infra Section IV.A.2.
99. See MILL supra note 85, at 68–69. This can additionally distort self-direction because
individuals may experience constant anxiety over others’ actions and may alter behavior to avoid
being victims.
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exemplifies a “distorting external force[]” undermining autonomy and
self-determination.100
Moreover, the transactional nature of cure fundamentally clashes
with the idea of inviolate natural rights. By creating a system where
compensation trades against natural rights violations, cure
commodifies inherently non-fungible values. For instance, legal
moralism seeks to suppress moral transgressions as inherent
“wrongs.” However, a cure regime proposes a market for such wrongs,
allowing parties to sin at will, as long as they pay for the indulgence.
Similarly, neutralism aims to preserve individuals’ options for selffulfillment. Allowing government to curtail such options, if it pays
reimbursement, contradicts neutralism’s core purpose.
Reconsidering the examples of eminent domain, drunk driving,
and climate change helps illustrate natural rights conceptions of harm
and the applicable prevention approaches. Starting with eminent
domain, from a neutralist perspective, the condemnation of Owner’s
home constitutes a harm because it coerces Owner despite her causing
no injury to others. The prospect of compensation (i.e. cure) cannot
redeem this coercion; rather a neutralist analysis would disallow (i.e.
prevent) the condemnation.
A legal moralist approach would reach similar results. Though
legal moralism permits laws to pursue moral commitments,
condemning Owner’s home to build a highway fall outside that moral
authority.101 Thus the condemnation unduly constrains moral action,
harming autonomy and requiring prevention.
In the case of drunk driving, the neutralist and legal moralist
perspectives diverge regarding harm. To a legal moralist, drunk
driving likely represents an inherent wrong, regardless of its
consequences. Thus, laws against drunk driving validly prevent
immoral behavior and do not unduly infringe on liberty.

100. Cf. Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J.
1335, 1339 (1986) (discussing how liberty and control are lost when one confers to another the
ability to diminish the value of one’s resources, subject to compensation); Christman, supra note
81 (providing an overview of autonomy in political and moral philosophy).
101. Cf. George, supra note 91 (explaining the tension between government’s duty to act for
the common good and individual liberty).

(7) 54.4_PAPPAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1090

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

11/18/21 12:45 PM

[Vol. 54:1067

For a neutralist, however, not all drunk driving is a harm because
not all drunk driving injures others.102 As a result, blanket prohibitions
on drunk driving harm actors by unduly infringing their liberty.
Therefore, laws prohibiting drunk driving should be replaced (i.e.
prevented) with more tailored measures that protect the liberty of both
actors and victims.
Finally, regarding climate change, from both neutralist and legal
moralist perspectives it is debatable whether greenhouse gas emissions
are harms. Climate change threatens to be a distorting external force
that fetters individuals’ autonomy, and all greenhouse gas emissions
contribute to climate change. However, the neutralist question is
whether any particular emission injures an individual. If so, then
emissions are harms. But, if particular emissions are too attenuated
from manifest climate injuries, then they are not neutralist harms.
For a legal moralist, whether emissions are harms depends on
whether they transgress a given moral code. Of course, this depends
on one’s particular code, but even holding moral commitments
constant, the answer is elusive.103 For instance, some Evangelical
Christians argue the moral necessity of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions,104 while others find emission reductions morally
reprehensible.105 Thus, natural rights perspectives can differ over
whether greenhouse gas emissions are harms.

102. Cf. Gorsuch, supra note 83, at 666 (presenting a theory of neutralism in which the
government may only employ coercive means, such as criminal sanctions, to prevent choices that
result in harm to others). A neutralist could take the position that drunk driving always constitutes
a harm to others (i.e., a harm to the liberty of potential victims) because drunk driving creates a
likelihood, if not certainty, of injury to potential victims. Adopting this premise, a neutralist could
justify a prohibition on drunk driving as consistent with the harm principle.
103. Cf. Alex Shashkevich, Stanford Research Examines Moral Significance of Actions
Causing Climate Change, STAN. NEWS (Feb. 23, 2017), https://news.stanford.edu/2017/02/23/mo
ral-element-climate-change/ (discussing research that aims to create frameworks governments can
use to evaluate the moral implications of their energy policies).
104. See, e.g., Samantha Harrington, Christian Author Sees Climate Change as a Moral Issue,
YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (July 16, 2019), https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/07
/christian-author-sees-climate-change-as-a-moral-issue/; see also Suzanne Goldenberg, Climate
Denial Is Immoral, Says Head of US Episcopal Church, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2015, 9:12 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/24/climate-change-denial-immoral-sayshead-episcopal-church (discussing various religious leaders’ positions that climate denial is
immoral).
105. See, e.g., An Evangelical Declaration on Global Warming, CORNWALL ALL.,
https://cornwallalliance.org/2009/05/evangelical-declaration-on-global-warming/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021).

(7) 54.4_PAPPAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

PREVENTION AND CURE

11/18/21 12:45 PM

1091

Assuming emissions are harms, then both legal moralist and
neutralist perspectives counsel prevention.106 This is the posture taken
in the well-publicized climate change lawsuit Juliana v. United
States.107 In that case, the plaintiffs assert a fundamental (and natural)
right to “a climate system capable of sustaining human life.”108 To
protect that right, they ask the court to order prevention in the form of
mandatory government action to remediate greenhouse gas
emissions.109
However, if greenhouse gas emissions are not harms, then
emissions limits themselves harm the liberty of actors and should be
prevented. Such reasoning appears in prominent Evangelical
opposition to emissions reduction policies.110
4. Distributive Justice
Distributive justice perspectives maintain that concepts of
“justice” should guide allocations of burdens and benefits.111 Theorists
have proposed various normative criteria for just allocations,
including principles of desert, strict egalitarianism, and feminism.112
Among these, John Rawls’s “difference principle” remains
particularly influential.113 Rawls argues that justice requires resource
106. What level of prevention is a separate and important question. As philosopher Blake
Francis has observed,
Carbon dioxide emissions won’t ever go away—we exhale it . . . . So there is nothing
inherently wrong with emitting carbon dioxide. But there does seem to be something
terribly wrong with the scale of human emissions since the Industrial Revolution. But at
the same time, we are all the beneficiaries of incredibly important advancements in
medicine, science, infrastructure and other areas from the Industrial Revolution.
Shashkevich, supra note 103.
107. 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
108. Id. at 1164 (internal quotations omitted).
109. Id. at 1164–65.
110. See, e.g., An Evangelical Declaration on Global Warming, supra note 105.
111. See, e.g., David Elkins, Responding to Rawls: Toward a Consistent and Supportable
Theory of Distributive Justice, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 267, 267 (2007); Julian Lamont & Christi Favor,
Distributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/; Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective
Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 535 (1992).
112. See, e.g., Lamont & Favor, supra note 111. While some notions of justice may derive from
natural rights-based principles, including ideas of liberty and autonomy, see, e.g., JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 169, 174 (2d ed. 2011), this section considers distributive
justice separately from the liberty-based natural rights commitments.
113. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75 (1971); Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need:
The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877, 879–80 (1976);
Christian Barry, Redistribution, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://plato.stanford
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distributions to aid the worst-off and disrupt the inequitable status
quo.114
From a distributive justice perspective, harm arises when a
distribution conflicts with a given vision of justice. For example, a
Rawlsian harm arises from any unequal distribution that fails to
benefit the poorest members of society.115 Alternatively, from a strict
egalitarian perspective, any unequal allocation constitutes a harm.
Both prevention and cure can potentially address distributive
justice harms. All distributive harms are theoretically curable through
reallocation of resources, and cure is the only option to address both
preexisting distributive harms, such as entrenched injustices, or
unavoidable harms, such as natural unfairness in skill or ability.116
Prevention, in the form of just initial distributions, is possible only for
ongoing or future allocations.117
Reconsidering the examples of eminent domain, drunk driving,
and climate change is instructive. From a Rawlsian perspective,
whether the condemnation of Owner’s home is a harm depends on
Owner’s status in society and the allocation of benefits from the
highway project. For instance, if Owner is impoverished and the
highway will primarily benefit the wealthy, then the condemnation is
a harmful injustice. This harm could be prevented by desisting the
condemnation, or it could be cured by redistributing greater benefits
to Owner, such as by paying her more than her subjective value for the
home.118
Moving to drunk driving, data suggests that alcohol-related
crashes disproportionately impact recent Latino immigrants,
particularly undocumented ones.119 Such outsized burdens on a
.edu/entries/redistribution/.
114. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 23 (1993); Grey, supra note 113, at 880;
Elkins, supra note 111, at 291–92.
115. Barry, supra note 113.
116. Elkins, supra note 111, at 291–92.
117. For example, environmental and energy law scholars have suggested that in the transition
from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy sources, policies should prospectively avoid replicating
historic inequities in allocating burdens and benefits. See, e.g., Shelley Welton & Joel Eisen, Clean
Energy Justice: Charting an Emerging Agenda, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 321 (2019).
118. Cf. Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741, 751, 761 (1999)
(discussing compensation for takings of substantial segments of an injured party’s estate).
119. Mariana Sanchez et al., Drinking and Driving Among Recent Latino Immigrants: The
Impact of Neighborhoods and Social Support, 13 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1055
(2016).
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marginalized community represent a Rawlsian harm. In response,
prevention policies might try to reduce disproportionate drunk driving
in immigrant communities,120 or cure polities might allocate greater
support services to help immigrant communities cope with higher
rates of drunk driving.
Finally, turning to climate change, distributive harms can arise
both from climate change impacts and from emissions reduction
policies. Climate change will disproportionately afflict the poor and
vulnerable, causing displacement and hunger and risking “climate
apartheid.”121 Recognizing this concern, the “climate justice”
movement pursues policies both to decrease greenhouse gas emissions
(i.e. prevent future disproportionate impacts) and to help communities
“access[] revenue generation opportunities in the new energy
economy” (i.e. cure entrenched inequities by reallocating
resources).122
However, efforts to avoid climate change can also cause
distributive harms. For instance, emissions reduction policies can
disproportionately impact low-income communities by raising energy
and transportation prices.123 Some argue for preventing these
distributive harms by leaving greenhouse gas emissions
unregulated.124 Others suggest a cure approach like a “revenue neutral
carbon tax,”125 which uses pricing to reduce emissions but then

120. This risks a different distributive harm of over-policing these communities. Similar
instances of over-policing have occurred in other minority communities, and to prevent such
distributive harms enforcement policies have been discontinued. Cf. Joseph Goldstein, Sniff Test
Does Not Prove Public Drinking, a Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2012), https://www.nytimes
.com/2012/06/15/nyregion/sniff-test-doesnt-prove-public-drinking-judge-says.html (describing a
court’s ruling that police officer sniff tests are insufficient to establish the alcoholic content of a
beverage consumed in public); Joe Satran, The Secret History of the War on Public Drinking,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec. 6,
2017),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/public-drinkinglaws_n_4312523.
121. World Faces ‘Climate Apartheid’ Risk, 120 More Million in Poverty: UN Expert, U.N.
NEWS (June 25, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/06/1041261.
122. NAACP Environmental and Climate Justice Program, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, https://www.naacp.org/environmental-climate-justiceabout/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
123. See, e.g., NAACP Environmental and Climate Justice Program, supra note 122.
124. An Evangelical Declaration on Global Warming, supra note 105.
125. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Opinion, Trump Pulled Us Out of the Paris Accord. So What’s
the Conservative Playbook for Climate Change?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019, 12:14 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-11-05/post-paris-accords-conservatives-need-aclimate-plan.
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redistributes tax proceeds to aid those disproportionately impacted by
the reductions.126
B. Scenarios Suggesting Predominant Prevention or Cure Strategies
This section identifies particular scenarios that suggest
predominant prevention or cure strategies, and it explores how these
scenarios arise under positivist, utilitarian, natural rights, and
distributive justice perspectives. Specifically, it differentiates between
readily curable harms that favor cure versus effectively incurable
harms that call for prevention. It also considers justifiable harms that
recommend cure and undesirable acts that suggest prevention. Finally,
it discusses how efforts to coordinate behavior counsel prevention
approaches. Throughout, it illustrates these scenarios with climate
change examples.
1. Readily Curable Versus Effectively Incurable Harms
One factor suggesting either predominant prevention or cure is an
action’s consequences: whether its harms are reparable. For readily
curable harms, a cure approach suffices, whereas effectively incurable
harms call for prevention.
The difference between readily curable and effectively incurable
harms arises from the practical limitations of cure. Cure has only three
tools to address harms: repair, replacement, and compensation. As a
result, cure satisfyingly remedies harms to reparable interests (e.g., by
fixing a car), replaceable interests (e.g., by providing a new car), or
commodifiable interests (e.g., by providing the monetary value of a
car). Such harms are readily curable,127 and avoiding them may not be
worth the foregone behavior.
However, interests that are not reparable, replaceable, or
compensable128 are effectively incurable because the tools of cure

126. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax: Canada,
https://unfccc.int/climate-action/momentum-for-change/financing-for-climate-friendly/revenueneutral-carbon-tax (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
127. As discussed infra Section IV.A.2.a, in such cases a liability-rule remedy and a propertyrule remedy (assuming no opportunistic inflation) should yield essentially the same result, and
either should provide adequate compensation.
128. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1005–
06 (1982).
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mismatch the harms.129 Irreparable interests cannot be repaired (e.g.,
a deceased loved one cannot be fixed), and irreplaceable interests
cannot be replaced (e.g., a new loved one cannot be supplied). The
only remaining cure option is compensation, but this proves clumsy
when interests are incommensurable with money (e.g., the financial
equivalent of a loved one).130 Thus, irreparable, irreplaceable, and
non-commodified interests suggest predominant prevention
strategies.131
Positivism, utilitarianism, natural rights, and distributive justice
offer different visions of relatively curable and effectively incurable
harms. Under positivism, laws delineate what is curable and
incurable.132 A contractor may remedy unpermitted construction by
purchasing a retroactive permit (readily curable), whereas a legislature
may not implement an unconstitutional law, even with compensation
(effectively incurable). In the climate change context, laws that
recognize climate harms treat them as relatively incurable and
accordingly prioritize preventive emission reductions. For example,
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act identifies numerous
irreparable climate impacts133 to justify imposing 80% emission
reductions by 2050.134
Utilitarian commitments treat individual losses as readily curable,
allowing them to tradeoff in cost-benefit analyses.135 However, social
welfare losses are effectively incurable because they impoverish

129. In such cases, a liability-rule remedy and a property-rule remedy would likely diverge
greatly, and neither may be adequate compensation. See infra Section IV.A.2.a.
130. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
845–46 (1994) (discussing the nexus between incommensurability and property and liability rules);
Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH
L. REV. 683, 713–14.
131. See Michael Pappas & Victor B. Flatt, Climate Changes Property: Disaster,
Decommodification, and Retreat, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 331, 389 (2021) (suggesting that when markets
have not naturally emerged for certain interests, this suggests an implicit collective calculus that
commodifying those interests is unsuitable and undesirable); Radin, supra note 128, at 1005–06.
132. See supra Section II.A.1.
133. See Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501
(Deering 2021).
134. 2017 Scoping Plan Documents, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ourwork/programs/ab-32-climate-change-scoping-plan/2017-scoping-plan-documents (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021).
135. See supra Section II.A.2.
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society and shrink the production possibility frontier.136 Thus, if
climate change causes social welfare losses, then it is an incurable
harm that counsels prevention via emissions reductions.137
Similarly, because natural rights perspectives consider any undue
incursion on liberty effectively incurable, if greenhouse gas emissions
constitute a natural rights harm, then prevention is in order.138
Finally, while all distributive harms are theoretically curable via
redistribution, practical limitations render some distributive harms
effectively incurable.139 Appreciating this distinction helps navigate
the seemingly irreconcilable distributive justice concerns with both
climate change impacts and greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Regressive impacts of climate change, including the displacement of
impoverished communities, can yield subjective losses that are
effectively incurable. Conversely, regressive monetary burdens from
emissions limits are readily curable through financial redistribution.
Thus, policies can simultaneously address both distributive justice
concerns via prevention for climate impacts complemented with cure
for disproportionate financial burdens. Plans for revenue neutral
carbon taxes propose just such a balance.140
2. Justifiable Harm or Undesirable Behavior
Another influence for preferring predominant prevention or cure
is an action’s context: whether the action is justifiable, regardless of
its harmful impacts, or whether it is undesirable, despite not causing
apparent injury. Justifiable actions suggest cure, whereas undesirable
behavior recommends prevention.
Examples of justifiable harms include transgressions driven by
human necessity. For instance, acts of theft to avert starvation or
trespass to escape peril are justifiable even though they cause harms.
While prevention of theft or trespass could ordinarily be appropriate,

136. Lesson 1: Are Disasters Good for the Economy?, FOUND. FOR TEACHING ECON.,
https://www.fte.org/teachers/teacher-resources/lesson-plans/disasterslessons/lesson-1-aredisasters-good-for-the-economy/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
137. See Expert Report of Joseph E. Stiglitz, supra note 70, at 9; Rendall, supra note 73, at 445.
138. See supra Section II.A.3.
139. See supra Section II.A.4.
140. See supra Section IV.C.2.a.
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in these contexts preventing the harms would endanger human life.141
The justifiability of these acts advises a cure strategy.
Alternately some acts may be undesirable, regardless of
consequence. For example, drunk driving may be universally
unwelcome, even when no one gets hurt.142 Addressing such
“damnum absque injuria” or “negligence in the air”143 suggests
predominant prevention.
Again, positivist, utilitarian, natural rights, and distributive
justice perspectives offer different ideas of justifiable and undesirable
acts.144 To a positivist, justifiable actions and undesirable behaviors
are simply a matter of definition. Permitted acts are, implicitly,
justifiable, and unpermitted acts are, implicitly, undesirable. The later
are prevented while the former are not.
To a utilitarian, actions are justifiable, even if they cause injury,
as long as their benefits outweigh their costs. For example, theft to
avert starvation is justifiable because the benefits (a life saved)
outweigh the costs (stolen food). Utilitarianism would not prevent
such action and would consider its impacts cured by the offsetting
social gains. Conversely, actions that cause more aggregate cost than
benefit are undesirable, even if some instances do not cause injuries.
Drunk driving fits this description, and utilitarian analysis supports
preventing drunk driving to a level that avoids social welfare losses.145
When applied to natural rights, the concepts of justifiable action
and undesirable behavior highlight core differences between neutralist
and legal moralist commitments. For a neutralist, the concepts are
inapposite because no injury-causing behavior is justifiable (it
infringes the liberty of victims), and no behavior is undesirable unless
it causes injury (to protect the liberty of actors). For a legal moralist,
actions can be justifiable or undesirable depending on their
consistency with a given moral code. Actions reflecting moral
principles are justifiable, regardless of their impacts. For example,
healthcare providers might morally refuse to perform certain services,

141. Though society may wish to prevent such circumstances from arising in the first place.
142. Cf., e.g., Fennell, supra note 95, at 1408 (explaining that self-help measures may be taken
to avoid factory pollution even in the absence of any harmful result).
143. See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920).
144. See discussion supra Section II.A.
145. See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
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regardless of consequences for patients.146 Alternatively, legal
moralists might find some behavior, such as buying alcohol on
Sundays, fundamentally undesirable and prevent it regardless of its
consequences.147
Finally, analysis of justifiability or undesirability adds little to
distributive justice inquiries, which already incorporate contextual
evaluations. From a distributive perspective, justifiable actions are the
same as non-harmful actions; they facilitate a desired distributional
outcome. Similarly, undesirable actions are the same as harmful
actions; they thwart desired distributions.148
Returning to climate change, the link between justifiable actions
and cure helps explain policies, like the Trump Administration’s
Affordable Clean Energy Rule,149 that minimally restrict greenhouse
gas emissions.150 Such policies implicitly (or explicitly) reason that
emissions are so socially and economically important that they are
worth potential climate harms. Because they consider emissions
justifiable,151 these policies disfavor prevention (i.e., deprioritize
emission reductions) and preference cure (i.e., react to climate impacts
that arise).152
3. Coordination
Finally, efforts to coordinate behavior call for predominant
prevention strategies. While most policies try to influence behavior,
sometimes coordination itself becomes a central aim. For instance,
coordinated behavior can provide a solution for “prisoners’ dilemma”

146. Cf. Conscience Protections for Health Care Providers, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/conscience/conscience-protections/index.html (last updated Mar. 22,
2018) (detailing several protections for health care providers who are unwilling to perform
abortions).
147. See supra Section II.A.3.
148. See supra Section II.A.4.
149. Affordable Clean Energy Rule, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov
/stationary-sources-air-pollution/affordable-clean-energy-rule (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
150. See Burtraw & Keyes, supra note 75 (describing the limited emissions reductions of the
rule).
151. Few would suggest that greenhouse gas emissions are inherently undesirable regardless of
their impacts. Indeed, all living beings emit greenhouse gasses. Cf. Shashkevich, supra note 103
(discussing the balancing of benefits and trade-offs in fields relevant to climate change).
152. As discussed infra Section IV.A.1.c., this may be limited to external cure through disaster
assistance or even letting losses fall where they may.
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and “tragedy of the commons” problems.153 Additionally,
“coordination games” model situations where coordinated activity
produces the best outcome. A common example is the “driving game.”
It describes two drivers approaching each other from opposite
directions on a narrow road. To avoid colliding, both drivers must
swerve to the side, and swerving left or right are equally appealing.
Here, the most important factor is that the drivers coordinate. Whether
they swerve left or right is immaterial; that they choose in a concerted
fashion (both to their left or both to their right) determines whether
they pass safely. In scenarios like these, coordination itself is a core
objective, and legal contexts ranging from contract doctrines to
Commerce Clause jurisprudence place a premium on coordination.154
Prevention offers clearer information to facilitate coordination
than does cure.155 Revisiting the driving game, a prevention approach,
such as a sign directing traffic, fosters easy coordination. Cure cannot
harmonize behavior so directly. While drivers could decide how to
swerve based on information from past collisions,156 that would be
costlier and less consistent than a preventive approach.157
Promoting coordination via prevention is consistent with
positivism and utilitarianism. Innumerable positive laws, such as
traffic regulations, coordinate through prevention. Additionally, using
prevention to lower coordination costs has utilitarian appeal. Natural
rights perspectives also accommodate coordinative prevention, as long
as it does not infringe liberty. Neutralists would accept coordination
to avoid harms, and legal moralists adopt coordination to promote
morals. Finally, distributive justice can embrace prevention to
coordinate preferred distributive outcomes.158

153. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
154. See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Constitutional Law’s Conflicting Premises, 96 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 447, 451–52 (2020).
155. See Viscusi, supra note 42, at 76.
156. This would involve using information about cure to inform private precaution.
157. Viscusi, supra note 42, at 72, 76 (“The great benefit of regulation is that every party
covered by the regulation does not incur information costs. In contrast, the tort system imposes
information costs for every case.”). Cf. Shavell, supra note 8, at 358–71 (juxtaposing activities
controlled mainly by liability and activities subject to significant preventative regulation); George,
supra note 5, at 186–87 (illustrating the need for a preventative measure, namely government
regulation, to maintain highway traffic safety).
158. See supra Section II.A.
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Turning again to climate change, coordination challenges have
hampered international emission-reduction efforts, but the Paris
Agreement demonstrates how a prevention policy can help overcome
coordination barriers. Prior to 2016, the United States and other
nations hesitated to reduce emissions without a shared global
commitment.159 In 2016, the Paris Agreement invited such
international cooperation through a treaty to prevent global
temperatures from exceeding a stated level.160 To date 191 nations
have joined the Agreement,161 and its shared prevention goal has been
instrumental for nations to coordinate their emission reductions.
III. IMPERFECTIONS IN APPLIED PREVENTION AND CURE
The previous Part considered how prevention and cure
conceptually fit with different normative values and factual scenarios.
This Part addresses the practical limitations of applied prevention and
cure approaches.
In theory, prevention could precisely avoid harms without undue
constraints. And, in theory, actors could effectually cure all harms they
cause. However, practical applications of prevention and cure will
almost certainly be flawed. They may be over-inclusive or underinclusive (and sometimes may actually be both).162 This Part explores
the imperfections likely to arise in applied prevention and cure, and it
considers how they impact positivist, utilitarian, natural rights, and
159. See History of UN Climate Talks, CTR. CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/content/history-of-un-climate-talks/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
160. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Paris Agreement,
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021).
161. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement—Status of
Ratification, https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification (last visited
Apr. 11, 2021). The Trump Administration formally withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Agreement
in 2020 based on its disagreement with the substance of the emission reduction commitments. See
Frank Jordans & Seth Borenstein, US Formally Exits Paris Pact Aiming to Curb Climate Change,
AP NEWS (Nov. 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/us-leaves-paris-agreement-climate-change1331bc30021756454dda8eb7ff3c1075; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawalfrom-the-paris-agreement/index.html. The U.S. has since rejoined the Paris Agreement under the
Biden Administration. See Statement, White House, Paris Climate Agreement (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/paris-climateagreement/. No other countries have attempted to withdraw.
162. Prevention may be both over- and under-inclusive if it both over-constrains behavior and
still does not adequately avoid harm. Cure may be both over- and under-inclusive by imposing too
much liability on some parties and too little on others.

(7) 54.4_PAPPAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

PREVENTION AND CURE

11/18/21 12:45 PM

1101

distributive justice commitments. It also offers examples of how these
imperfections manifest in the climate change context.
A. Over-inclusive and Under-inclusive Prevention
Prevention measures may be either over-inclusive, constraining
too much behavior, or under-inclusive, permitting too many harms.
Knowledge limitations and political pressures contribute to both overand under-inclusion. Additionally, uncertainties, transaction costs,
under-protections, and under-compensation can cause over-inclusive
prevention.
1. Knowledge Limitations
To avoid harms, prevention measures must anticipate when and
how harms will arise. Such predictions may be informed, but they
cannot be certain. Thus, knowledge limitations pose an inherent
challenge for prevention regimes.163 Sometimes a lack of knowledge
begets over-inclusive prevention, whether intentionally prophylactic
or simply misestimated. In other cases, knowledge limitations may
cause under-inclusive prevention due to misunderstood risks or
unforeseen harms.
These knowledge limitations frustrate utilitarian efforts to predict
the costs and benefits of prevention measures. Additionally, because
knowledge limitations cause ill tailoring of prevention regimes, they
raise natural rights concerns about infringement on the liberty of
victims (with under-inclusion) or actors (with over-inclusion).
Knowledge limitations loom large for climate change policies.
Beyond the scientific consensus that human-induced climate change
is occurring,164 high uncertainty shrouds nearly every prediction of
climate change impacts and timing.165 Most environmentalists believe
these knowledge limitations have resulted in under-inclusive efforts to
prevent climate change, whereas opponents of greenhouse gas
163. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 722–23 (explaining that a problem with liability
rules is that the behavior of parties prior to takings must be considered); Viscusi, supra note 42, at
87 (concluding that even workers’ compensation, which passes benefits to claimants with very little
distortion, does not create efficient risk-reduction incentives).
164. Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming, NASA GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2021).
165. See, e.g., Matt Simon, Climate Change Is Very Real. But So Much of It Is Uncertain,
WIRED (July 17, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/climate-change-is-very-real-butso-much-of-it-is-uncertain/.
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regulation worry that knowledge limitations have created overinclusive prevention.166
2. Political Pressures
Political pressures can also cause over- or under-inclusion in
government-imposed prevention measures.167 Prevention efforts can
generate concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, making them a target
for interest groups who lobby to capture benefits while spreading
burdens.
This can drive over-inclusive prevention. For instance, interest
group pressures might produce unwarranted licensure requirements or
environmental regulations that claim to prevent harms but actually just
restrict competition.168 Alternately, political pressures can cause
under-inclusive prevention. For example, interest-group influence can
hollow environmental protections, ossify outdated regulations,169 or
secure carve-outs for favored industries.170
These political pressures can undermine positivist commitments
by compromising the lawmaking process, and they can subvert
utilitarian principles by promoting inefficient policies. Further,
interest group influence raises distributive justice concerns. If
powerful actors can advantageously shape or navigate prevention
measures, they enrich themselves at the expense of the less
fortunate.171

166. See, e.g., id.
167. External prevention is not necessarily hopelessly subject to these influences. For example,
some commentators suggest that competing interest groups may check each other. See, e.g., JAMES
RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 5 (3d ed. 2016). Others suggest that
spreading regulatory authority over multiple public institutions helps avoid concentrated influence.
See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1599–1600 (2007).
168. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1495, 1515 (1999); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the
Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 508 (1988).
169. See Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Soft Regulators, Tough Judges, 15 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 119, 120, 123 (2007); Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Tradeoffs Between
Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from Insurance Class Actions, 1 J. TORT L., no. 3, 2007, at 1,
4.
170. See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain, Shale Gas and Clean Energy Policy, 63 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1187, 1210 (2013).
171. Cf. De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 169, at 125 (explaining that different law is
aimed at controlling the behavior of rich and poor injurers).
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Climate change policies evidence such political pressures. In
particular, powerful fossil fuel and energy industries have lobbied
heavily to curb emission-reduction measures,172 arguably leading to
under-inclusive prevention of climate change.173
3. Uncertainty, Transaction Costs, Under-protection and Undercompensation
Private actors may adopt internal prevention measures174 to avoid
costs,175 and such incentive-based prevention can be efficient and
well-tailored. However, uncertainties, transaction costs, underprotections, and under-compensation incentivize over-inclusive
internal prevention, which can foreclose desirable actions and gainful
trades.176
For instance, uncertainty over liabilities and the transaction costs
of gaining certainty can lead parties to forego beneficial behavior. As
an illustration, recall the example of efficient breach: Actor contracts
with Victim to supply a product worth $100 to Victim (i.e., expectancy
damages are $100), but then Better Price offers to buy Actor’s product
for $210. If Actor is confident that she will owe only expectancy
damages, then Actor should breach, pay Victim expectancy damages
of $100, sell to Better Price for $210, and end up with $110. Given
certainty about her liability, Actor has little incentive to exercise
private prevention and avoid the breach. However, if Actor is unsure
whether her damages will exceed $110, she may exercise prevention
and avoid the breach, even if it would have ultimately been
worthwhile.177
As the example shows, if a party faces uncertain liability or
transaction costs, she may adopt over-inclusive prevention and forego
otherwise beneficial behavior. This is a variation on Ronald Coase’s
172. Fossil Fuel Interests Have Outspent Environmental Advocates 10:1 on Climate Lobbying,
YALE ENV’T 360 (July 19, 2018), https://e360.yale.edu/digest/fossil-fuel-interests-have-outspentenvironmental-advocates-101-on-climate-lobbying.
173. Though opponents of climate regulation argue the opposite: that environmentalist political
influence has led to over-inclusive prevention of emissions.
174. See infra Section IV.A.1 (discussing internal prevention).
175. See supra Section I.C.
176. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960)
(explaining how actions of firms may have harmful effects on others).
177. Cf. Shavell, supra note 31, at 6 & n.16 (introducing the same concept as it relates to goods
and property sales).
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insight that individuals will not make otherwise gainful trades if
transaction costs outweigh the benefits of the trade.178 Similarly,
actors will not take otherwise gainful actions (i.e., will exercise overinclusive prevention) if the uncertainties and transaction costs
outweigh the potential gains.
Payments to “patent trolls”179 further illustrate how legal
uncertainties and transaction costs induce over-inclusive private
prevention. Patent trolls typically acquire patents to threaten
infringement suits against companies.180 In doing so, patent trolls bet
that companies will pay for a license, even if the patent claim is
questionable, because that would be cheaper than litigating the
patent’s validity.181 Thus, patent trolls expect companies to employ
over-inclusive internal prevention (in the form of purchasing licenses)
because of legal uncertainties and transaction costs.182 If the patent’s
invalidity were certain or litigation costs were low, companies might
proceed despite the patent troll’s threat, but the high uncertainty and
transaction costs frequently lead companies to deploy over-inclusive
prevention by paying trolls.183
Private parties may also employ over-inclusive prevention if they
believe that their interests will be under-protected or their losses will
be under-compensated.184 For instance, if property rights are illenforced, then property holders will likely undertake excessive
precautions (like special locks or private security) to guard against
harms.185 Such over-inclusive prevention comes at the opportunity
cost of more desirable pursuits. Similarly, if bicyclists are

178. See Coase, supra note 176, at 15–19.
179. “Patent troll” is a derogatory term for an entity that uses a patent for profit via licensing or
litigation rather than for innovation or production. See, e.g., David S. Abrams et al., The Patent
Troll: Benign Middleman or Stick-Up Artist? 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 25713, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25713. More derogatory still, some label “patent
trolls” as “stick-up artists.” See id. at 3.
180. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 2008 (2007).
181. Id. at 2009.
182. Id. at 2008–10.
183. Id.
184. This correlates with under-inclusive cure, discussed infra Section III.B.1.
185. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 722; see also Henry E. Smith, Property and
Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1730 (2004) (explaining how high-valuing property
owners can “opt-out” of the legal system with self-protection measures).
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systematically under-compensated in automotive collisions, fewer
people are likely to bicycle, even if they would like to.
Some climate change responses reflect over-inclusive private
prevention due to uncertainty. For instance, some parties have begun
hoarding resources to buffer unknown climate risks, and these actions
are likely both over-protective and socially damaging.186
B. Over-inclusive and Under-inclusive Cure
Like prevention, cure too can be over- and under-inclusive.
Under-inclusive cure allows actors to externalize costs and neglects to
make victims whole. Over-inclusive cure imposes disproportionate
costs on actors and undermines victims’ incentives for precaution.
1. Under-inclusive Cure
Cure measures are under-inclusive when they allow actors to
externalize costs onto victims. By allowing actors to retain their
actions’ benefits but offload their costs, under-inclusive cure both
under-compensates victims187 and creates perverse incentives for
actors.
Some cure measures are intentionally under-inclusive and
externalize costs by design. Most obviously, tort immunity doctrines
free some actors of cure obligations. Doctrines limiting the scope of
liability, such as the negligence concept of proximate cause, also
purposefully cabin cure duties.188 Similarly, bankruptcy doctrines that
discharge debts and other instances of judgment-proof actors occasion
under-inclusive cure.189 Finally, some damages doctrines, like
statutory damage caps or rules limiting non-economic damages,190
expressly limit cure by externalizing some (sometimes all) costs of
action.191
186. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Climate Triage: A Resources Trust to Address Inequality in a ClimateChanged World, 50 ENVTL. L. 97, 107–08 (2020).
187. Viscusi, supra note 42, at 96–97.
188. See, e.g., HARRY SHULMAN ET AL., LAW OF TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 281–329
(6th ed. 2015). For example, a train that causes a major fire may be liable for damages to a structure
adjacent to the track but not to additional neighboring ones. See id.
189. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 721; De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 169,
at 121; cf. F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1418–19 (1986)
(explaining how limited liability may distort incentives to take preventative measures).
190. See, e.g., SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 188; STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32.
191. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 746 (illustrating the concept through the example
of a property owner who has an entitlement to burn leaves at the cost of his neighbors).
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Other doctrines default to under-inclusive cure by forcing victims
to overcome barriers to recovery. For example, placing burdens of
proof on plaintiffs sets a presumption of under-inclusive cure by
denying remedies in close cases.192
While these examples may represent calculated policies to
subsidize particular actors, they nonetheless embody under-inclusive
cure because they force victims to bear externalized costs. This raises
positivist, utilitarian, natural rights, and distributive justice concerns.
For example, measures that allow actors to retain benefits but spread
costs create suspicion of rent seeking and interest group influence,
potentially challenging positivist legitimacy.193 Additionally,
externalized costs grate against utilitarian analysis and create
incentives that can amplify social welfare losses.194 Under-inclusive
cure encourages actors to continue harmful conduct without optimal
precaution195 and victims to adopt over-inclusive prevention
measures.196 This also ignores natural rights commitments by
stripping protection of victims’ autonomy,197 and it likely has
regressive distributive impacts because those least able to protect
themselves will bear more externalized costs.198
Regarding climate change, the consistent failure of climate-based
tort claims provides an overarching example of under-inclusive
cure.199 The doctrinal hurdles in tort law have allowed the parties most
responsible for greenhouse gas emissions to externalize essentially all
remedial costs.200

192. Viscusi, supra note 42, at 69.
193. Cf. Yotam Kaplan, In Defense of Compensation, 70 ALA. L. REV. 573, 604 (2018) (using
the example of a home security system to illustrate this point).
194. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 8, at 359–71.
195. See discussion of the model of precaution and the interplay between prevention and cure,
supra Part I. See also De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 169, at 140 (noting that there is no
general regulatory standard prompting injurers to take the best level of precaution).
196. See supra Section III.A.
197. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 326 (1992).
198. See Kaplan, supra note 193, at 575–76.
199. See generally Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENV’T
L. 1, 2–44 (2011) (discussing obstacles in climate change litigation and the subsequent lack of
satisfactory remedy).
200. Id.
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2. Over-inclusive Cure
Cure may be over-inclusive in two regards: how much is paid and
who pays. First, over-inclusive cure can describe excessive liability
that obligates actors to overcompensate for harms. Second, overinclusive cure can describe overbroad remedial duties or gratuitous
care. In either case, over-inclusive cure yields problematic incentives.
Overcompensation requirements raise the costs of activity and
may induce actors to decrease desirable behavior (resulting in overinclusive internal prevention).201 For instance, some argue that
medical malpractice liability is excessive and that it increases costs,
depresses access, and lowers quality of healthcare.202 Commentators
also suggest that products liability damages for asbestos are inordinate
and produce undesirable results.203 Additionally, overcompensation
can incentivize potential victims to neglect their own precautions,
causing under-inclusive internal prevention.204
Over-inclusive cure can also involve overbroad liability
spreading or gratuitous care. Unlike overcompensation, which saddles
injury-causing actors with too much cost, overbroad liability
spreading can impose too little cost on injury-causing actors, allowing
them to externalize burdens for harms they produce. Such overinclusive cure can arise if an entire industry or the public at large foots
the bill for a privately caused harm.205 Gratuitous care has similar
effects. For instance, if a third party, such as a doctor in the family,
treats injuries at no cost to the victim or, importantly, to the actor,206
then the actor has externalized the costs of the injury.207
Policies may intentionally embrace over-inclusive cure to ensure
that victims have recourse for harms, and allocating resources to
protect victims potentially advances distributive justice principles.
201. See infra Section IV.A.1.a (discussion of internal prevention).
202. See Medical Malpractice Litigation Raises Health Care Cost, Reduces Access and Lowers
Quality of Care, EMP. POL’Y FOUND. (June 19, 2003), https://www.heartland.org/_templateassets/documents/publications/14736.pdf.
203. See Viscusi, supra note 42, at 99–100.
204. See infra Part IV.
205. There is an important distinction between this liability spreading, which externalizes costs,
and the passing of costs to consumers, which internalizes harm.
206. See SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 188, at 291.
207. The same result can arise from any positive externalities. For instance, unpriced ecosystem
services can sometimes effectively neutralize private parties’ pollution, allowing the polluter to
avoid bearing those pollution costs. See NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 266–68 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997).
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However, positivist, utilitarian, and natural rights worries may persist.
Both overcompensation and liability spreading ply government
policies to concentrate benefits, so they may implicate positivist
concerns with interest-group influence and rent seeking.208 Further,
utilitarians may fear that over-inclusive cure distorts costs and benefits
to the point of social welfare losses.209 Finally, requirements of
overcompensation or liability spreading threaten the natural rights
liberty of actors by imposing undue obligations.210
Climate change offers numerous examples of over-inclusive cure
via overbroad liability spreading. To take a global instance, the costs
of greenhouse gas emissions are borne globally, even though a small
group of nations contribute the great majority of these emissions.211
Because these costs, as well as any remedial efforts, are distributed
disproportionately to causation, climate change imposes overinclusive cure.
IV. INTEGRATED PREVENTION AND CURE STRATEGIES
This Part explores how integrated strategies of prevention and
cure can mitigate over- and under-inclusion concerns and advance
various positivist, utilitarian, natural rights, and distributive justice
commitments. To build a foundation for discussing these integrated
strategies, Section A first analyzes major variations of prevention and
cure and illustrates how these variations fit together to shape
individual prevention and cure measures. Then, Section B details how
particular complementary prevention and cure measures can combine
symbiotically to advance policy goals. Finally, Section C examines
how a suite of prevention and cure measures can assemble into
interconnected policy landscapes, and it applies these insights to
explain and critique policy structures addressing motorist behavior
and climate change. In particular, it uncovers how current climate
policy suffers because of disjointed prevention and cure measures, and
it suggests how expanding particular cure variations can reinforce
climate policy efforts.
208. See discussion infra Section II.A.1.
209. See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
210. See discussion infra Section II.A.3.
211. See Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
(Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2-emissions.
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A. Major Variations of Prevention and Cure
This section explores four important variations of prevention and
cure: (1) external or internal, (2) property-rule or liability-rule, (3) exante or ex-post, and (4) actor-presumptive or victim-presumptive. It
illustrates each of these variations through climate change examples.
Before engaging these variations in detail, Figure 1 offers a visual
overview to demonstrate how the variations fit together within the
prevention and cure framework.
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Figure 1: Flowchart of Prevention and Cure Framework
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As Figure 1 illustrates, the analysis begins by identifying a harm
(top row in figure) and adopting either a prevention or cure approach
to address that harm (second row). Then both prevention and cure
approaches offer possible variations. Both prevention and cure can be
either internal or external (third row), liability-rule or property-rule
(fourth row),212 ex-ante or ex-post (fifth row), and actor-presumptive
or victim-presumptive (sixth row).213
This set of variations is cumulative, meaning that any applied
instance of prevention or cure reflects a set of choices about each
variation. Accordingly, Figure 1 presents the variations as a flowchart
to depict how the ultimate result of all variation choices (seventh row,
left blank) describes an individual policy measure for addressing a
harm.
As subsequent sections discuss, these individual policy measures
(which ultimately populate the seventh row, and which Section IV.C
will illustrate with examples regarding motorist behavior and climate
change) can combine into integrated policy landscapes. For now,
Section A builds the foundation for later sections by detailing the
particular variations underlying individual prevention and cure
measures.
1. External or Internal
Prevention and cure may be either external or internal. For
prevention, the distinction between external and internal turns on the
entity imposing the precaution, whereas the difference between
external and internal cure turns on the entity supplying the remedy.
a. External or internal prevention
Efforts to prevent harm may come from external or internal
sources. External prevention measures rely on governmental authority
to limit or compel certain actions, and prescriptive regulations are the
quintessential example. For instance, a stop sign is an external
prevention measure to avoid the harm of auto accidents. External
prevention also includes legal limits on governmental powers, such as
212. As discussed infra Section IV.A.2, the property-rule versus liability-rule distinction is not
applicable to internal prevention.
213. As discussed infra Section IV.A.4, the actor presumption versus victim presumption is
also not applicable to internal prevention.
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constitutional provisions proscribing certain government actions.214
The unifying feature of external prevention measures is that the force
of law directly dictates actions.
Conversely, internal prevention measures are essentially selfregulation; they involve actors’ self-directed efforts to avoid harms.
These measures are not mandated by law, but they often arise in
reaction to incentives created by legal obligations.215 For example,
internal prevention frequently aims to cost-effectively avert legal
liabilities, either by obviating the causes of harm or by staving off
victims’ realization of harm.
To avoid the causes of harm, parties can undertake precautions.
For example, manufacturers might sua sponte include warning labels
or physical guards on potentially dangerous products. Parties may also
avoid causing harm by desisting activities. For example, a
manufacturer may discontinue producing a dangerous product.
Alternatively, actors may forestall victims’ realization of harm by
preemptively acquiring legal entitlements to avoid infringing upon
them.216 This reflects internal prevention through consolidation. For
example, a noisy factory might purchase surrounding properties to
avoid nuisance liabilities. Such consolidation does not change the
harm-causing activity; the factory remains noisy. Rather, it removes
would-be victims from the position to realize harm. Thus,
consolidation measures attempt to, quite literally, internalize
impacts.217
214. For example, constitutional amendments beginning “nor shall congress . . .” or “no state
shall . . . .” See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
215. See supra Part III. Internal prevention can also arise in response to numerous other
motivations. For example, neighborly norms may lead to individuals not undertaking noisy actions,
such as mowing lawns, before 10:00 AM, even if the actions would trigger no liability. Internal
prevention may also seek to avoid other costs, such as client or employee dissatisfaction, fluctuation
in revenues or input prices, or transaction costs. See supra Part III.
216. See Coase, supra note 176, at 8–15; cf. Fennell, supra note 95, at 1458 (explaining that
explicit government-sanctioned options, such as purchasing a license or paying a tax, allow parties
to gauge benefits of engaging in an activity).
217. In some instances, courts disfavor, and sometimes invalidate, attempts to use consolidation
as an internal prevention strategy. For example, courts have frequently invalidated attempts by
doctors to secure exculpatory clauses for medical malpractice. See, e.g., Matthew J.B. Lawrence,
Note, In Search of an Enforceable Medical Malpractice Exculpatory Agreement: Introducing
Confidential Contracts as a Solution to the Doctor-Patient Relationship Problem, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 850, 854 (2009).
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Regardless of whether internal prevention measures address the
causes or realization of harms, they share one unifying feature: selfimposition.
Internal and external prevention measures are not necessarily
exclusive. In fact, parties often adopt internal prevention on top of
external prevention, particularly when regulatory compliance does not
guarantee freedom from liability.218 For example, some municipal
regulations (external prevention) merely require shoveling snow from
a sidewalk within eight hours of daylight,219 but individuals may still
preemptively salt sidewalks or clear snow earlier (internal prevention)
to avoid potential negligence liability.
Indeed, some policies use external prevention to induce internal
prevention. For instance, environmental cap-and-trade policies
mandate maximum pollution levels (external prevention) but then
allow trading of pollution entitlements, expecting that some firms will
voluntarily reduce pollution (internal prevention) to sell their
entitlements.220 Thus, external and internal prevention can be mutually
reinforcing.221
However, in other situations, external and internal prevention
may tradeoff against each other, at least at the margins. For instance,
internal prevention efforts can displace external prevention. This can
be desirable; private actions may reduce harms enough to obviate
public regulation. However, if private efforts are fleeting or ineffective
or if they come at the expense of public values, transparency, and
procedural safeguards,222 then internal displacement of external
prevention becomes disquieting.
Conversely, external prevention may also displace internal
precautions, which can produce perverse incentives. For example, the
“Peltzman effect” hypothesis suggests that individuals react to public
218. See Shavell, supra note 8, at 371; De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 169, at 120.
219. See, e.g., D.C. DIST. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DO THE RIGHT THING! CLEAR YOUR
SIDEWALKS, https://ddot.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ddot/page_content/attachments/Sidewa
lk%20Snow%20Clearing%20Responsibilities%20-%20Residents%20and%20Private%20Propert
y%20Owners.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
220. See Viscusi, supra note 42, at 77–78.
221. See De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 169, at 125.
222. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1290 (2003); Dave Owen, Consultants, the Environment, and the Law, 61 ARIZ. L.
REV. 823, 824–25 (2019); Joshua Ulan Galperin, Foreword, Private, Environmental, Governance,
9 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 1, 2 (2018).
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precautions, like car safety regulations, by reducing private
precautions, like safe driving.223 Along similar lines, some argue that
federal policies to prevent wildfires and floods lead individuals to
undertake riskier development in hazardous areas.224 Thus, external
prevention can erode internal prevention and create moral hazards.
Whether operating as complements or substitutes, internal and
external prevention have relative strengths and weaknesses,
particularly for addressing knowledge limitations and residual risk.
For instance, while knowledge limitations beset all prevention
measures, external or internal prevention can offer relative knowledge
advantages for avoiding certain harms. Internal prevention provides
knowledge advantages for highly contextual harm avoidance, whereas
external prevention may better address acontextual risks. As Steven
Shavell has argued, when avoiding harm depends on contextual
details, private actors can possess superior knowledge.225 Shavell
offers the example of an individual cutting down a tree near a
neighbor’s house.226 Since the individual can appreciate the precise
size and location of the tree, she can tailor precautions more
effectively than a public regulator might.227 Conversely, when harm
avoidance depends on more general, acontextual information, public
regulators can have knowledge advantages. Shavell poses the example
of a small fumigation company that applies pesticides without fully
understanding their chemistry.228 In this instance, the risk of harm
depends more on the pesticide than on the immediate factual context,
and the public regulator may possess superior knowledge about the
chemicals’ risks.229
External prevention can also offer advantages for lowering
residual risks. Though no prevention measure can completely
eliminate risk, external prevention can reduce residual risk more
223. See Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677
(1975).
224. See Alison Berry, Forest Policy Up in Smoke: Fire Suppression in the United States, PROP.
& ENV’T RSCH. CTR., https://www.perc.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/Forest_Policy_Up_in
_Smoke.pdf.
225. See Shavell, supra note 8, at 366.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 369.
229. See id. at 359–60, 369; see also Viscusi, supra note 42, at 76 (explaining the general
benefits of governmental regulation based on governmental knowledge).
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directly, predictably, and extensively than can internal prevention.
Because internal prevention is individual and largely incentive-based,
policy efforts can only indirectly influence internal prevention, such
as by changing incentive structures. Additionally, individuals are
unlikely to adopt more precaution than they find individually costeffective. However, external prevention can directly impose
precautions to reduce residual risk, and it can calibrate precautions
based on values other than cost-effectiveness. For example, external
prevention can maximize saving lives rather than economic efficiency
by imposing more protective precautions than would be cost-effective
for some individuals.230
A hypothetical helps illustrate these points: Imagine a dangerous
industry, where if negligence leads to a fatality, a firm’s total expected
cost231 is $2 million per fatality. Through cost-effective precautions, a
firm can avoid all but two fatalities per year. Finally, precautions to
reduce yearly fatalities from two to one would cost an additional $3
million per year.
Under these facts, the two yearly fatalities represent residual risk
that cannot be avoided by cost-effective precautions. To reduce
fatalities from two to one would cost more ($3 million) than a firm
would save ($2 million at most),232 so firms have no financial
incentive to lower this risk.
If policymakers seek to lower annual fatalities from two to one
(i.e., reduce residual risk), external prevention can directly pursue this
goal. Policies could require the necessary precautions to reduce
fatalities, or they could mandate that firms cease operating if they
cause more than one yearly fatality. Under the given facts, such
measures would plainly require firms to take more precaution than
their individual incentives would otherwise direct (i.e., spending $3
million to save $2 million, or ceasing operation). However, the
regulation would predictably advance the policymakers’ goal of
decreasing fatalities.
230. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 42, at 89; Adler & Posner, supra note 37, at 245–47.
231. Inclusive of liability and all other relevant costs.
232. Under the negligence standard, the firm may be acting reasonably by taking precautions
that avoid all but two yearly fatalities. If so, the firm would not actually be liable for the two yearly
fatalities, meaning that additional precautions would not actually avoid any costs. However, if the
firm were found to negligently violate the duty of reasonable care, it would face $2 million for the
fatality.
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Conversely, policies attempting to lower fatalities through
internal prevention would be indirect and unpredictable. Policymakers
might try to raise the cost of fatalities, say to $4 million per fatality,
but the path for doing so is murky because policies may not be able to
increase negligence damage awards in a predictable and targeted way.
To influence internal prevention would require circuitous efforts to
adjust liability (i.e., cure) without certain results.
Obviously, this hypothetical presents a stylized scenario, but it
illustrates how external prevention offers advantages for reducing
residual risk.
b. External or internal cure
Cure can also be external or internal, depending on the party that
supplies the remedy. Internal cure regimes require the harm-causing233
actor to provide a remedy, thereby internalizing cure obligations.
External cure regimes place cure burdens on entities other than the
harm-causing actor.
Examples of internal cure are familiar. Tort doctrines follow this
approach, at least nominally.234 Additionally, regulatory takings and
eminent domain reflect internal cure approaches because the harmcausing actor, even if a government entity, bears remedial liabilities
internally.235
External cure arises anytime harm burdens fall on entities other
than the harm-causing actor. This includes burdens on groups, the
general public, or victims themselves. For example, social insurance
programs, like the worker’s compensation program, the social security
disabilities program, and the National Flood Insurance program, create
external cure structures because remedies come from groups that did
not cause the harms at issue.236 Further, doctrines that recognize
immunities or limit damages impose external cure by spreading cure
burdens to victims rather than harm-causing actors. Similarly, policies
233. A Coasian view might object to this normative use of the term causation. See generally
Coase, supra note 176, at 2 (discussing reciprocal causation). However, this use of the term assumes
that entitlements are already determined.
234. If tort regimes systematically allow for externalized costs of harm, they become de facto
external cure regimes.
235. However, to the extent these doctrines externalize subjective losses, they can be seen as
engaging some external cure.
236. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 17–18; Viscusi, supra note 42, at 70.
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that fully externalize costs onto victims—for example, by letting
harms fall where they may—represent external cure approaches.
Internal cure comports with ideas of market discipline and,
possibly, justice. By forcing actors to internalize their costs, it sends
market signals about desirable behavior. Alternatively, external cure
undercuts market discipline in service of other goals like subsidizing
actions and, in the case of social insurance, ensuring compensation for
victims.237
Policies can choose between internal and external cure
approaches, or they can combine them as alternative remedies. For
example, adopting internal cure along with external cure (in the form
of social insurance) in reserve can protect victims from judgementproof defendants. Some environmental laws take such an approach,
holding responsible parties liable for pollution but also providing
public funds as a backstop for environmental cleanup.238
c. Graphical depiction and application to climate change
Figure 2 summarizes internal and external variations on
prevention and cure.

237. See Viscusi, supra note 42, at 66.
238. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2018).
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Figure 2: Internal and External Prevention and Cure
Internal

External

Prevention

Actors’ self-directed
precaution

Government-imposed
regulation

Cure

Harm-causing actor has
remedial obligation

An entity other than the harmcausing actor (a group, the
general public, or the victim
herself) bears the harm burden

The following climate change examples showcase internal and
external variations on prevention and cure.
On the prevention side, external prevention measures include
government regulations aimed at mitigating climate change effects by
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For example, California’s Global
Warming Solutions Act requires 80% emission reductions by 2050.239
Alternately, internal prevention measures entail voluntary efforts to
mitigate climate change impacts. Such internal prevention can occur
at small scales—for example, when individuals try to reduce their
carbon footprints—or at large scales, such as when corporations elect
to limit their emissions through “private environmental
governance.”240
As for cure, internal cure would involve liability for climate
change harms in proportion to contribution to climate change. While
some tort suits have pursued such internal cure—for example, by
alleging that major greenhouse gas emitters are liable for climateexacerbated hurricane damages241—all such attempts have been
unsuccessful.242 At the present, no legislation or judicial decision has
imposed liability proportionate to climate change causation, so there
are no examples of actual internal cure for climate change harms.
Rather, in the context of climate change, all cure practice has been
239.
240.
(2013).
241.
242.

2017 Scoping Plan Documents, supra note 134.
See Michael Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129
See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1050 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
See, e.g., id. at 1055.
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external, meaning that the costs of climate change harms have fallen
disproportionately to greenhouse gas emissions. Such external cure
has come in the form of social insurance—for example, via disaster
assistance programs that alleviate burdens of climate-exacerbated
storms or floods. Additionally, external cure has entailed individual
victims bearing their own costs of climate impacts, for example by
expending their own funds to rebuild or relocate after climate-induced
storms or floods.
Figure 3 summarizes these climate change examples of internal
and external prevention and cure.
Figure 3: Examples of Internal and External Prevention and Cure
Internal

External

Prevention

Voluntary reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions

Government-imposed
reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions

Cure

Major greenhouse gas
emitters are liable for
climate change harms

Disaster assistance programs
or victims pay for climate
change harms

2. Property Rule or Liability Rule
Another important variation for prevention and cure is whether
they employ property rules or liability rules. Liability rules impose
relatively objective prices, often linked to market prices, whereas
property rules impose relatively subjective prices, which can exceed
market prices and theoretically approach the infinite.243 Prevention
can regulate behavior through either property rules or liability rules,
and cure can offer either property-rule or liability-rule remedies.

243. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 756–57 (observing property rules and liability rules
as a continuum from zero to infinitely high damages); see also Andrew Blair-Stanek, Tax in the
Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Tax, 99 VA. L. REV. 1169, 1175–77 (2013)
(summarizing scholarship on property rules and liability rules).
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a. Prevention by property rule or liability rule
Prevention measures (specifically external prevention)244 can
direct behavior via liability rules or property rules. Liability-rule
prevention charges a predictable monetary price for restricted
behavior. Alternatively, property-rule prevention mandates
performance on threat of imprisonment, compelled behavior, or
escalating penalties.
Examples of liability-rule prevention include measures that
restrict behavior by imposing costs. For example, parking meters
disallow parking absent a payment of either the meter rate beforehand
or a parking ticket afterwards. Similarly, carbon taxes prohibit
pollution without payment of a fee. Moreover, countless other fines,
pricing mechanisms, and Pigouvian taxes245 fit this description. All
constrain behavior subject to relatively predictable monetary costs.
Contrarily, property-rule prevention mandates behavior on
penalty of incarceration or other coercion. A primary example of
property-rule prevention is criminal liability.246 Additionally, any
prevention measures that enforce performance via punitive damage
awards, civil contempt proceedings, or injunctions adopt a propertyrule approach.
Prevention regimes can, and often do, combine liability rules and
property rules. Enforcement of restricted behavior may begin with
predictable fines (liability-rule prevention) and escalate to punitive
monetary figures or court orders (property-rule prevention).247 For
example, to prevent trespass, the common law imposes nominal or
economic damages (liability-rule prevention) for isolated instances
but injunction (property-rule prevention) for threat of repeated
trespass.
Liability-rule prevention can be more adaptable than propertyrule prevention, making it more appealing from some perspectives and
244. The distinction between property-rule and liability-rule enforcement is not meaningful for
internal prevention measures, which are voluntarily adopted and thus not subject to enforcement.
245. “Pigouvian taxes” are fees imposed to discourage certain undesired behaviors. See, e.g.,
Arthur Cecil Pigou, 1877-1959, THE LIBR. OF ECONS. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/
Enc/bios/Pigou.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
246. See, e.g., Blair-Stanek, supra note 243, 1192 n.164; cf. Coleman, supra note 64, at 923
(explaining the theory behind criminal liability through a hypothetical incident in which a guitar is
stolen).
247. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, 70–71.
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less appealing from others. Since liability-rule prevention allows
actors to either comply or pay, individuals can exercise greater choice.
This can help reduce over-inclusive prevention, contributing to
utilitarian social welfare and preserving greater autonomy for actors.
However, liability-rule prevention risks being under-inclusive.
Utilitarians might worry that it will systematically underprice harmful
behavior, and legal moralists can criticize it for institutionalizing
markets for immoral behavior.248 Finally, liability-rule prevention
may be ill suited to address either the very wealthy, for whom the cost
may be trivial, or the very poor, who may be effectively judgment
proof and therefore unaffected by price.249 In such contexts, propertyrule prevention may be more appropriate.250
b. Cure by property rule or liability rule
In the context of cure, remedies reflect either property rules or
liability rules, depending on who determines the extent of the remedy.
Many cure approaches employ liability rules whereby an objective
third party designates the cost of remedying harm. For example, torts
doctrines rely on judges or juries to award damages, and eminent
domain looks to fair market value.
Alternatively, some cure doctrines take a property-rule approach,
requiring actors to satisfy victims’ wishes when remedying harms. For
instance, courts have awarded property-rule remedies in trespass cases
involving building encroachments, where an actor builds a structure
that inadvertently crosses a few inches into a victim’s property.251 In
such cases, courts have imposed injunctions that require the actor to
either remove the encroaching structure or pay the victim’s chosen
price.252 Some environmental statutes also apply property-rule cure
approaches by requiring actors to undo environmental harms via
248. This opens liability-rule prevention to a natural rights criticism similar to that of cure. See
supra Section II.A.3; Fennell, supra note 95, at 1418 (identifying “a morally grating locution like
‘an entitlement to pollute’”); see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory
Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 360–61, 370–71 (2006) (comparing meritless institutions
like murder and racism to somewhat-beneficial pollution, and suggesting changing naming
conventions to address this difference).
249. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 18–19.
250. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 721.
251. See, e.g., Pile v Pedrick, 31 A. 646, 647 (Pa. 1895).
252. See, e.g., id. These injunctions could also be seen as ex-post prevention of future trespass,
but since they seek to remedy victims, they better resemble cure.
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abatement, remediation, and restoration.253 Similarly, environmental
compensatory mitigation programs require developers to replace
environmental function lost as a result of development.254
The general tradeoffs between such property-rule and liabilityrule approaches are well rehearsed, but in the context of cure, a few
bear emphasizing. First, liability-rule cure can raise utilitarian, natural
rights, and distributive concerns if damage awards systematically
undercompensate victims.255 If this is the case, cure is under-inclusive,
allowing actors to externalize costs and encroach further onto victims’
liberties. Such externalized costs can render a nominally internal cure
regime into a de facto external cure regime. Property-rule approaches
can counteract such instances of under-inclusive cure by allowing
victims to indicate what would make them whole.
With that said, property-rule cure can also potentially lead to
foregone beneficial behavior via both over-inclusive prevention and
over-inclusive cure. Since property-rule damages are less predictable
than liability-rule damages, the uncertainty over exposure could lead
actors to over-inclusive internal prevention of desirable actions.256
Property-rules can also create over-inclusive cure by positioning
victims to opportunistically demand overcompensation, which would
also create incentives for actors to refrain from desirable activities.
Because cure imposes a transactional relationship in which the victim
has constructively sold harm at a yet-to-be determined price, the actor
is in a must-pay situation. If the victim can then choose the price, she
may strategically demand an inflated or even extortionate sum,
knowing that the harm-causing actor cannot exit the transaction and
cannot verify her subjective valuation of the harm.257 To borrow
economic terminology for this scenario, property-rule cure can put the

253. See Heidi Wendel, Note, Restoration as the Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage
to Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 430, 442 (1991); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1321 (2018); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2018).
254. See, e.g., section 404 of the Clean Water Act wetlands program. U.S. ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, WETLANDS COMPENSATORY MITIGATION, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2015-08/documents/compensatory_mitigation_factsheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
255. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 731 (arguing that altering the process by which
damages are calculated to better approximate harm would increase disputes and consume greater
resources).
256. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 185, at 1730.
257. See, e.g., id. at 1729.
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victim in the position to extract “appropriable quasi-rents,”258 which
can decrease social welfare as well as infringe on the liberties of
actors.
c. Graphical depiction and application to climate change
Figures 4 summarizes property-rule and liability-rule variations
on prevention and cure.
Figure 4: Property-Rule and Liability-Rule Prevention and Cure
Property Rule
Required performance
enforced by imprisonment,
Prevention
compelled behavior, or
escalating penalties

Cure

Victim determines costs of
remedying harm

Liability Rule

Predictable monetary price
for restricted behavior

Objective third party
determines costs of
remedying harm

Climate change examples help illustrate property-rule and
liability-rule variations on prevention and cure.
Policies to prevent climate change harms have adopted both
property-rule and liability-rule approaches to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. For example, as discussed above, a carbon tax is a liabilityrule measure for greenhouse gas reductions. One can pay a fixed price
to emit greenhouse gasses, and there is no upper limit on emissions.
Thus, restricted behavior is priced not prohibited.
Alternatively, a cap-and-trade regime reflects a property-rule
prevention approach. Cap-and-trade policies prescribe a total level of
greenhouse gas emissions (i.e., a cap), allocate emission entitlements
within that cap, and then allow entitlement-holders to buy or sell
entitlements (i.e., trade).259 This represents a property rule because it
mandates certain performance standards: force of law prohibits
258. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 22.
259. Steven Nadel, More States and Provinces Adopt Carbon Pricing to Cut Emissions,
ACEEE: BLOG (Jan. 3, 2019), https://aceee.org/blog/2019/01/more-states-and-provinces-adopt.
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emitting greenhouse gasses beyond one’s entitlements, and it prohibits
total emissions beyond the cap. Because cap-and-trade policies
employ a performance-based, property-rule approach, there is no
guaranteed opportunity to emit greenhouse gasses at a given price.260
Rather, a would-be emitter must meet some entitlement holder’s
chosen price or cease emitting, and the price of emission entitlements
can increase based on subjective valuation and demand.
Regarding cure, a property-rule approach would allow victims to
designate the appropriate remedy for their climate change harms.
Though such approaches are relatively uncommon, voluntary buyout
programs for disaster-ravaged properties provide a limited example.
Under such programs, government agencies offer to purchase
properties damaged by climate-exacerbated disasters like storms or
floods.261 When property owners elect to be bought-out, they
implicitly choose the buyout price as sufficient compensation for their
climate-harmed property.262 For property owners who opt to sell,
voluntary buyout programs reflect property-rule cure for some climate
harms.
More commonly, cure for climate change harms involves liability
rules. For instance, disaster-assistance or flood-insurance programs
provide victims a fixed amount of compensation according to some
schedule of relief.
Figure 5 summarizes these climate change examples of propertyrule and liability-rule prevention and cure.

260. Id.
261. New York’s voluntary buyback program for climate-vulnerable properties is an example.
See, e.g., Buyout and Acquisition Programs, N.Y. GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF STORM RECOVERY,
https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/housing/buyout-acquisition-programs (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
262. While this remedy may not be perfect, the acceptance suggests that it is adequate in the
eyes of the participating parties.
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Figure 5: Examples of Property-Rule and Liability-Rule
Prevention and Cure
Property Rule

Liability Rule

Prevention

Greenhouse gas capand-trade

Carbon tax

Cure

Voluntary buyout
participation

Disaster assistance or flood
insurance with fixed schedule of
damages

3. Ex-Ante or Ex-Post
Prevention and cure approaches may also employ different timing
variations. They may deploy ex-ante measures before a given harm or
ex-post measures after a particular harm. This distinction is relative
rather than absolute; whether an approach is ex ante or ex post must
be measured from a designated event. Nonetheless, the election of exante or ex-post approaches can have important practical implications.
a. Ex-ante and ex-post prevention
Since prevention efforts seek to avoid harms, they can lend
themselves to predictive, ex-ante outlooks. However, ex-post
prevention is just as common. By instituting behavioral limits after
some harms have occurred, ex-post prevention can benefit from
increased knowledge and possibly offer better tailoring, albeit at the
cost of the preceding harms.
Ex-ante prevention seeks to anticipate and avoid harms before
they occur. For instance, regulations limiting scientific research on
cloning, genome editing, or infectious disease263 exemplify ex-ante
external prevention. In the same vein, private companies sometimes
decline to make certain technologies available to the public, or to the
263. See generally Natalie Ram, Science as Speech, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1187 (2017) (examining
federal regulation of scientific experimentation and research).
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military,264 out of concern about possible harms. This represents exante internal prevention, as do consolidation efforts, such as a noisy
factory’s prospective purchase of surrounding properties.
Prevention efforts also frequently take ex-post forms, imposing
behavioral limits in response to harms that have already arisen. There
are countless examples of ex-post internal prevention; these occur
whenever an actor institutes precautions following a particular
accident or liability. Ex-post external prevention is also routine. For
instance, numerous federal environmental laws were enacted in
response to environmental disasters.265 Additionally, court-ordered
“prophylactic remedies” not only compensate for past harms but also
compel measures to avoid similar harms.266 For instance, to redress
sexual harassment, courts may not only assess damages (i.e., cure) but
also require new employment practices, employee training, and
grievance procedures (ex-post prevention).267
The major tradeoffs between ex-ante and ex-post prevention
involve knowledge limitations and avoided harms. Ex-post prevention
can incorporate accumulated experience to inform its tailoring,268
albeit at the cost of allowing some harms to occur. But, experience
does not guarantee better harm avoidance, and the ex-post perspective
may skew prevention due to cognitive biases that overweight the
importance of recent, available, confirming, or intense information.
On the other hand, ex-ante prevention may avoid marginally more
foreseeable harms or irreparable losses. Further, despite (or, rather,
because of) these knowledge limitations, ex-ante prevention may
allow regulations (i.e., external prevention) to proceed under a sort of
“veil of ignorance,” potentially allowing decisions to be made on
264. Cf. Tony Romm & Drew Harwell, Microsoft Workers Call for Canceling Military
Contract for Technology that Could Turn Warfare into a “Video Game,” WASH. POST (Feb. 22,
2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/02/22/microsoft-workerscall-cancelling-military-contract-technology-that-could-turn-warfare-into-video-game/
(describing Microsoft’s choice to continue its relationship with the Defense Department despite
employee concerns).
265. See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY (6th ed. 2009) (describing the history of federal environmental laws).
266. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 272 (2d
ed. 1994).
267. See Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the Looking Glass
of Bush v. Gore, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 343, 352 (2002).
268. See Kyle D. Logue, In Praise of (Some) Ex Post Regulation: A Response to Professor
Galle, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 97, 122 (2016).
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principles and without knowledge of particular winners or losers.269
Thus, ex-ante prevention may marginally reduce interest-group
influence. However, because a lack of experience can heighten
knowledge limitations, ex-ante prevention increases risks of overinclusivity, by foreclosing too much behavior, or under-inclusivity, by
failing to accurately predict harms.
b. Ex-ante and ex-post cure
Cure frequently adopts an ex-post perspective by seeking to
remedy existing harms. However, cure obligations can also take an exante approach by securing remedies before harms arise.
Ex-post cure is typical of liability and social insurance structures;
there, the occurrence of harm triggers cure obligations. Ex-ante cure
is less common. It imposes cure obligations in anticipation of future
harms. For example, security deposits or bonding requirements make
actors post remedial funds before undertaking potentially harmcausing behavior.270 Environmental mitigation or offset requirements
similarly solicit ex-ante cure.271 For example, before destroying a
wetland, an actor may be tasked with replacing its ecological
function.272
The tradeoffs between ex-ante and ex-post cure involve balancing
barriers to action with assurances of compensation. Ex-post cure
imposes lower up-front costs, but it risks actors, like judgment-proof
defendants, who cannot remedy their harms. Ex-ante cure raises the
initial costs of action but assures that actors can provide some measure
of cure,273 avoiding the externalities associated with judgment-proof
defendants.274
269. See, e.g., Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715, 1723–24
(2015).
270. See, e.g., Maureen D. Carman, Regulatory and Transactional Bonding: A Primer on
Surety Bonding for the Mineral Lawyer, 17 E. MIN. L. FOUND. 227, 228 (1997).
271. See, e.g., Bruce R. Huber, Negative-Value Property, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021).
272. See Michael Faure & Jing Liu, New Models for the Compensation of Natural Resources
Damage, 4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RES. L. 261, 269 (2011–2012).
273. In this way ex-ante cure resembles liability-rule external prevention because it raises the
cost of actions which leads to decreased action. However, ex-ante cure retains a major distinction
from prevention: in the case of prevention, pricing schemes need not actually allocate revenues to
victims. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32. However, ex-ante cure provides assurances to victims
by holding funds for future compensation.
274. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 740.
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However, because ex-ante cure requires money up front, it
potentially imposes over-inclusive cure in the form of excessive shortterm costs. For example, some actors might ultimately be solvent for
longer-term liabilities but may not be able to afford immediate
bonding requirements. For those marginal actors, ex-ante cure could
foreclose otherwise cost-effective behavior. While there are various
ways to lower these short-term costs, the nature of ex-ante cure is that
it will impose costs earlier than will ex-post cure. This can assure
marginally more compensation, but it risks marginally less activity.
c. Graphical depiction and application to climate change
Figures 6 summarizes ex-ante and ex-post variations on
prevention and cure.
Figure 6: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Prevention and Cure
Ex Ante

Ex Post

Prevention

Behavior restricted in
anticipation of future harm

Behavior restricted in
reaction to past harm

Cure

Cure obligation secured in
advance of harm

Cure obligation secured after
harm

The climate change context offers additional examples of ex-ante
and ex-post prevention and cure efforts. Many greenhouse gas
reduction policies represent ex-ante prevention because they seek to
avoid future harms that have yet to manifest. For example, a major
goal for emission-reduction policies is to hold global temperature rise
below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, which will
hopefully avoid catastrophic climate change impacts.275
Other climate change policies represent ex-post prevention aimed
at dodging recurrence of harms. For instance, some disaster-response
policies buy properties flooded by climate-exacerbated storms and
275. See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 160.
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retire them from redevelopment, transforming them into greenspace
that will not be harmed by flooding and that can buffer communities
against future storms.276
In terms of cure, any disaster assistance or tort liability for climate
harms represents ex-post cure. As for ex-ante cure, examples arise
from “managed retreat” policies that preemptively buyout and relocate
climate-vulnerable populations, such as coastal communities
threatened by sea level rise, when harms are foreseeable but have yet
to occur.277
Figure 7 summarizes these examples of ex-ante and ex-post
prevention and cure.
Figure 7: Examples of Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Prevention and Cure
Ex Ante
Emissions reduction to
hold global temperature
Prevention rise below 2 degrees

Managed retreat policies
Cure

Ex Post
Retiring flooded properties
and managing them as
greenspace

Disaster assistance and tort
damages

4. Actor Presumption or Victim Presumption
Finally, both prevention and cure regimes can assign burdens of
proof to create presumptions in favor of either actors or victims. For
instance, external prevention278 measures may presume an action is
exempt from regulation unless proven otherwise (an actor
presumption), or that an action is restricted absent contrary evidence

276. Buyout and Acquisition Programs, supra note 261.
277. Managed Retreat Strategies, ADAPTATION CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.adaptation
clearinghouse.org/resources/managed-retreat-strategies.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
278. Delineating these presumptions is immaterial for internal prevention, which involves no
third-party arbiter to impose a burden of proof.
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(a victim presumption).279 The FDA employs an actor presumption for
foods derived from genetically modified plants.280 Such foods are
“generally recognized as safe,” and thus not subject to regulations
unless otherwise indicated.281 Conversely, some state water laws
impose a victim presumption through the “no harm rule,” which
disallows the transfer of water rights absent proof that the transfer will
not harm other water users.282
Internal and external cure regimes also create presumptions by
allocating burdens of proof. Actor presumptions are common. For
instance, negligence liability (internal cure) reflects an actor
presumption; to recover, a victim must prove duty, breach, causation,
and damages.283 Similarly, federal disaster assistance programs
(external cure) require victims to demonstrate that they qualify for
remedial programs.284
Victim presumptions are rarer but still arise in both internal and
external cure measures. For example, some radioactive waste facilities
are presumed liable (internal cure)285 for nearby radioactive
contamination.286 Additionally, hospital emergency rooms (external
cure) presume that victims are entitled to curative treatment.
a. Graphical depiction and application to climate change
Figure 8 summarizes actor-presumptive and victim-presumptive
variations on prevention and cure.

279. The “precautionary principle” in its strong form calls for such a presumption. See, e.g.,
Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV.
1285, 1288.
280. See Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992).
281. See id.
282. Scott C. Miller, Water Law 101: A Primer for Resource Developers and Landmen, 61
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., §§ 21.01–.02 (2015).
283. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 72.
284. See, e.g., Individual Assistance, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/individual-disasterassistance (last updated Dec. 16, 2020).
285. This liability constitutes internal cure because it imposes a remedial obligation on the actor
causing the harm. Here, the provision creates a presumption of causation. However, radioactive
waste facilities can rebut this presumption by proving that they did not cause the radioactive
contamination. Thus, remedial obligation turns on the question of causation, making this an internal
cure approach regardless of the presumption.
286. See, e.g., Pa. St. Healthcare L. Libr. 25 § 237.1 (2019).
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Figure 8: Actor-Presumptive and Victim-Presumptive Prevention
and Cure
Actor Presumption

Victim Presumption

Prevention

Presumption that action is
permitted

Presumption that action is
forbidden

Cure

Victim must prove
entitlement to remedy

Victim presumptively
entitled to remedy

Climate change policies feature a mix of actor presumptions and
victim presumptions. For instance, California regulations adopt both
actor-presumptive and victim-presumptive prevention measures
regarding greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions from certain activities
are presumptively regulated, absent a “demonstration of
nonapplicability” or “verification for reduced emissions.”287 This
represents a victim presumption because the emissions are regulated
unless proven otherwise. Alternately, some actions are presumed not
to have significant greenhouse gas emission impacts.288 This is an
actor presumption because, barring contrary evidence, these actions
are spared regulatory obligations.
Climate change cure can also demonstrate actor presumptions and
victim presumptions. For instance, climate change tort liability is
actor-presumptive; victims must prove their entitlement to a remedy.
Alternately, managed retreat efforts can be victim-presumptive if they
presuppose that residents of disaster-vulnerable areas are qualified for
buyouts and relocation efforts.
Figure 9 summarizes these examples of actor-presumptive and
victim presumptive prevention and cure.
287. CAL. AIR RES. BD., UNOFFICIAL ELECTRONIC VERSION OF THE REGULATION FOR THE
MANDATORY REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS § 95101(g)–(h) (Apr. 2019),
https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ghg-rep/regulation/mrr-2018-unofficial-2019-4-3.pdf.
288. See BAY AREA QUALITY MGMT. DIST., CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT:
AIR QUALITY GUIDELINES (May 2017), https://www.baaqmd.gov/~/media/files/planning-andresearch/ceqa/ceqa_guidelines_may2017-pdf.pdf.
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Figure 9: Examples of Actor-Presumptive and VictimPresumptive Prevention and Cure
Actor Presumption

Victim Presumption

Actions presumed not to
Prevention have significant emissions
impacts

Actions with presumptively
regulated emissions

Cure

Geography-based managed
retreat

Tort

B. Complementary Prevention and Cure Measures
As the previous section detailed, different alignments of the
prevention-and-cure variations can produce nuanced individual policy
measures. Still, any individual measure in isolation is limited and will
risk over- or under-inclusivity. Combining mutually reinforcing
prevention and cure measures allows for more holistic policy
approaches that can mitigate instances of over- and under-inclusivity.
This section identifies particularly complementary variations and
combinations of prevention and cure.
1. Addressing Under-inclusive Prevention
External prevention risks being under-inclusive due to knowledge
limitations and interest-group influence. Reinforcing external
prevention with internal cure measures can help counteract this underinclusivity.
External prevention measures will rarely be perfectly calibrated
to avoid harm.289 Knowledge limitations will leave some harms
unanticipated, and political pressures may drive policies to favor
particular interests at the expense of avoiding harms.290 As a result,

289. Even if prevention efforts were perfectly tailored, some residual risk of harm would
remain.
290. See supra Section III.A. Internal cure can also struggle from knowledge limitations and
can be reinforced by internal prevention.
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external prevention measures are apt to struggle with underinclusivity.
Internal cure can alleviate such under-inclusivity by providing
relief to victims and by creating incentives for actors to exercise welltailored internal prevention. For victims suffering un-avoided harms,
internal cure provides recourse.291 Moreover, by forcing actors to
internalize costs, internal cure creates incentives to foresee and avoid
potential harms via internal prevention. This helps mitigate the
knowledge limitations that beset external prevention, and it can help
temper interest-group influence on regulations.292 For example, even
if industry lobbying has secured favorable treatment such as minimal
regulation or nugatory safety requirements (under-inclusive external
prevention), the prospect of meaningful liability (internal cure
obligations) creates incentives for cost-effective precautions (internal
prevention). Thus, robust internal cure293 can mollify the potential
under-inclusivity of external prevention.
2. Addressing Over-inclusive Prevention
Uncertainty over liabilities can push internal prevention toward
over-inclusivity, potentially impeding desirable behavior. However,
particular cure variations can help increase certainty about liabilities
and thereby abate over-inclusive internal prevention. For instance,
liability-rule cure offers more predictable remedies than does
property-rule cure. Indeed, the examples of efficient breach discussed
in Parts I and III294 demonstrate how predictable liability-rule cure (in
the form of expectancy damages) is crucial for calibrating internal
prevention in that context. Additionally, ex-ante cure, such as bonding
requirements, offers actors certainty about their potential liabilities by
requiring that obligations be paid in advance. Adopting such cure
variations to reduce uncertainty can help actors tailor internal
prevention to avoid over-inclusivity.

291. This is so if it is not under-inclusive. See discussion infra Section IV.B.3.
292. Cf. Buzbee, supra note 167, at 1598 (advocating for policies that allow citizens and groups
to influence regulatory choices).
293. This requires ensuring that cure is truly internal.
294. See supra Section I.B.1. and Section III.A.3.
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3. Addressing Under-inclusive Cure
Under-inclusive cure can under-protect victims and create
problematic incentives for actors.
To address victims’ under-inclusivity concerns, cure regimes can
adopt property-rule, victim-presumptive, and ex-ante cure variations.
Property-rule cure empowers victims to designate satisfying remedies,
victim-presumptive cure increases victims’ access to remedies, and
ex-ante cure guards against judgment-proof actors. Combining some
or all of these variations helps shield victims against under-inclusive
cure, regardless of whether a cure regime is internal or external.
The distinction between internal and external cure becomes
important regarding under-inclusive cure’s incentives for actors. Since
internal cure forces actors to internalize harms, it creates incentives
for cost-effective precautions (internal prevention). Thus, internal cure
measures coupled with property rules, victim presumptions, and exante obligations militate against under-inclusive cure’s problematic
incentives and its under-compensation.
However, some instances of under-inclusive cure intentionally
subsidize actors, and it may prove politically infeasible to implement
robust internal cure, much less to couple it with property rules, victim
presumptions, and ex-ante obligations. In this case, external cure in
the form of social insurance may be preferable to address the
drawbacks of under-inclusive cure. Such social insurance could still
ensure that victims are made whole, especially if it employs property
rules or victim-presumptions. It could also retain subsidies for actors,
spreading the subsidy costs over society rather than concentrating
them on victims.
Finally, external prevention can reinforce these cure variations in
addressing under-inclusive cure. Regulations can generally
complement internal and external cure regimes by guiding behavior to
reduce residual risk, thereby decreasing instances of harm that provide
opportunities for under-inclusive cure. More specifically, external
prevention can couple with external cure to allow the benefits of social
insurance while still ensuring certain levels of precaution, thereby
avoiding increases in residual risk. This combination allows policies
to simultaneously protect victims and subsidize actors against liability
(both through social insurance), while still requiring actors to take
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some desirable precautions (through external prevention) that the
subsidized liability would otherwise undermine.
To illustrate this dynamic, recall the hypothetical dangerous
industry, where if negligence leads to a fatality, a firm’s total expected
cost is $2 million per fatality.295 Through precautions that are costeffective under the negligence regime, a firm could avoid all but two
fatalities per year.
Now, imagine that the relevant cure regime changes from
negligence (internal cure) to social insurance (external cure), whereby
victims still receive $2 million per fatality, but the firm contributes
only $500,000 of that amount. This social insurance subsidy changes
the firm’s calculation of cost-effective precaution. Since the firm bears
a much lower cost per fatality, more fatalities per year become cost
effective, and the firm will likely reduce precautions accordingly. In
turn, this increases residual risk. The firm’s former cost-effective
precautions prevented all but two yearly fatalities; the firm’s new costeffective precautions will allow more than two annual fatalities.
To counteract this effect, external prevention can complement
social insurance. For instance, a regulation could require the firm to
maintain precautions that prevent all but two yearly fatalities. This
would allow for the same social insurance benefits (guaranteeing
victims $2 million per fatality while reducing the firm’s liability costs
to $500,000 per fatality), but it would also maintain precaution levels
to avoid a spike in residual risk.
4. Addressing Over-inclusive Cure
When over-inclusive cure induces over-compensation, it can
stifle desirable behavior, and property-rule cure risks just such
overcompensation by potentially allowing victims to make strategic
inflated demands. However, combining property-rule cure with
complementary strategies can temper this risk. First, coupling
property-rules with external cure in the form of social insurance can
ease overcompensation burdens on actors. Second, limiting propertyrule cure to particular subject matters or coupling it with internal
prevention approaches like consolidation can limit the potential for
opportunistic demands that generate overcompensation. Finally,
295. See supra Section IV.A.1.a.
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blending the previous two strategies, social insurance could provide
property-rule cure only in situations that limit opportunistic demands.
First, property rules linked with social insurance can spread the
cost of cure broadly. For example, imagine that victims can name their
price for any nuisance harms caused by a noisy factory (property-rule
cure), but that the local municipality subsidies half the cost of all these
nuisance liabilities. Here victims may potentially demand
overcompensation, and the municipal subsidy would not remove the
possibility of such strategic behavior. In fact, it may increase the
likelihood by creating deeper pockets to meet such demands.
However, the subsidy could prevent concentrated overcompensation
burdens on the factory, allowing for the property-rule cure without
chilling desirable factory operations.
Second, to check overcompensation, property-rule cure could
apply only in situations where opportunistically inflating costs is
difficult. Such situations can arise from particular subject matters or
from prior agreements. For example, when cure entails demonstrable,
verifiable performance, victims cannot easily inflate harms. For
instance, tearing down an encroaching structure, remediating
pollution, or replacing ecological function are all tethered to verifiable
results.296 Because these measures of cure are performance based, they
restrict the possibility of victims seeking overcompensation.297
Similarly, prior agreements can also create measurable gauges of
harm, thereby limiting room for opportunistic demands. For instance,
liquidated damages clauses in contracts allow potential victims to state
in advance their expected measure of subjective harm,298 thereby
bounding potential remedy requests. Asking would-be victims to
anticipate harms in advance may not give a perfect measure of actual
harms, but it allows cure approaches to honor victims’ stated prices
(i.e., apply property rules) without too much concern about strategic
behavior.299
296. They may still leave room to argue about the extent and quality of the necessary
performance, but they are at least measurably performance based.
297. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 722–23 (identifying disadvantages of liability
rules).
298. See STEARNS ET AL., supra note 32, at 25.
299. Additionally, property rules can encourage ex-ante bargaining in these contexts. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 70 (4th ed. 1992); Kaplow & Shavell, supra
note 9, at 722.
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Such use of prior agreements shows how internal prevention via
consolidation can complement property-rule cure. For example,
imagine that a noisy factory contracts with neighboring Victim,
agreeing that the factory will pay Victim a set price if it emits loud
noise that disturbs Victim’s property. This contract represents internal
prevention via consolidation (the factory has prevented Victim’s
realization of harm), and it enables internal property-rule cure because
Victim will receive her chosen price (the agreed contract price) for the
noisy harm. All the while, because the price is settled in advance, the
contract limits the risk of Victim’s opportunistic demands.
Finally, property-rule cure regimes can combine social insurance
with verifiable measures of harm. For example, imagine that a
municipality wishes to subsidize a local noisy factory. The
municipality could commit to share the cost of the factory’s noise
contracts with its neighbors. This scenario combines internal
prevention (consolidation via noise contracts) with external cure (the
municipality shares the cost of curing the factory’s noise harms) that
simultaneously guarantees property-rule cure (victims receive their
chosen price for noise) and limits opportunistic behavior (the price is
agreed in advance).
C. Prevention and Cure in Integrated Policy Landscapes
Building on the previous sections, this section examines how
different prevention and cure measures interlace to form integrated
policy landscapes. In particular, it analyzes how layered sets of
external-prevention, cure, and internal-prevention measures compose
the policy structures surrounding motorist behavior and climate
change. These applications showcase the descriptive and prescriptive
capacity of the prevention-and-cure framework. The analysis of
motorist behavior demonstrates how interrelated prevention and cure
measures can coalesce into a coherent policy landscape. Conversely,
examination of climate change policy reveals individual prevention
and cure measures working largely in isolation, which hampers their
singular and cumulative effectiveness. This structural analysis
identifies complementary measures, particularly internal cure, that can
reinforce climate change policy.
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1. Motorist Behavior
A congruous web of prevention and cure measures governs
motorist behavior. Figure 10 depicts the policy landscape, and
subsequent sections discuss relevant external-prevention, cure, and
internal-prevention measures in detail. The final section analyzes how
these measures interact to form a consonant and consistent policy
landscape.
Figure 10: Motorist Behavior Policy Landscape
Harm

Prevention

Cure

Internal

Ante

Driving
cautiously;
Conducting safety
checks

External

Post

Driving more
cautiously and/or
less frequently

Internal

External

Liability

Property

Liability

Property

Ante

Ante

Ante

Post

Post

Victim

Victim

Actor

Victim

Strict liability for
commercial
drivers carrying
hazardous
materials

Negligence
standards for
driver collision

Actor

Height and weight
limits on bridges

Victim

Speed limits

Criminalization of
vehicular assault

Use of general tax
funds to repair
roads

a. External prevention
A variety of external prevention measures restrict motorist
behavior, with different approaches tailored to the desirability of
different actions.
For extremely undesirable behavior, like vehicular assault, a
maximum-prevention approach involves:
1) ex-ante,
2) property-rule,
3) external prevention, with
4) a victim presumption.
This configuration describes criminalization of behavior. The
state restricts behavior (external prevention); the behavior is presumed
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harmful unless proven otherwise (victim presumption); the restriction
attaches prior to harm occurring (ex-ante); and it is enforced via
imprisonment (property-rule).
However, such maximum prevention is overkill for unwanted
behavior, like speeding, that is undesirable but not as offensive.
Adjusting one variation, by shifting from a property rule to a liability
rule, offers a less stringent prevention approach:
1) ex-ante,
2) liability-rule,
3) external prevention, with
4) a victim presumption.
This describes traffic restrictions like speed limits. The state still
restricts behavior (external prevention); the behavior is presumed
harmful unless proven otherwise (victim presumption); and the
restriction attaches prior to harm occurring (ex-ante). However, now
the prevention is enforced via a fine (liability-rule).
For generally desirable behavior, prevention approaches become
less restrictive still. To accomplish this, the configuration can adjust
from victim presumption (behavior is restricted unless proven
otherwise) to actor presumption (behavior is unrestricted unless
proven otherwise). This change yields:
1) ex-ante,
2) liability-rule,
3) external prevention, with
4) an actor presumption.
This captures measures like weight and height restrictions for
trucks on particular bridges or roads. Under such restrictions, most
driving is allowed, but certain instances of demonstrably harmful
driving (weights or heights that prove harmful to infrastructure) are
subject to penalty.
b. Cure
Turning to cure, since all prevention efforts, even maximally
restrictive ones, leave residual risk, some harms will inevitably occur
from driving. Addressing such harms requires cure measures, which
can differ across causes or types of harm.
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To address harms caused by everyday behavior, such as damages
from one private driver colliding with another, a typical configuration
is:
1) ex-post,
2) liability-rule,
3) internal cure, with
4) an actor presumption.
This captures a negligence standard. Once a harm arises (ex-post),
if the victim can prove the elements of liability (actor presumption),
then the harm-causing actor must remedy the harm (internal cure) by
paying a court-determined sum (liability-rule).
Alternatively, to address harms from particularly dangerous
driving, the configuration can adjust to allow easier recovery for
victims. This yields:
1) ex-ante,
2) liability-rule,
3) internal cure, with
4) a victim presumption.
Now dangerous drivers who may cause harms must provide
remedies (internal cure) prospectively in the form of a bond (ex-ante),
and once the harm arises, the actor faces strict liability (victim
presumption) for a court-determined sum (liability-rule). Commercial
drivers carrying hazardous materials face cure structures like this.300
Finally, to address the accumulated harms that driving causes to
roads, a broad remedial configuration can impose:
1) ex-post,
2) property-rule,
3) external cure, with
4) a victim presumption.
This resembles the use of general tax funds to repair roads.301
Road damage arises from diffuse actors, but general taxes extend even
beyond the group that causes the harm, for example by reaching
infrequent drivers and non-drivers. As a result, harm-causing actors
300. See Insurance Filing Requirements, FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN.,
https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/registration/insurance-requirements (last updated Dec. 16, 2019).
301. See, e.g., Tony Dutzik & Gideon Weissman, Who Pays for Roads? How the “Users Pay”
Myth Gets in the Way of Solving America’s Transportation Problems, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND &
FRONTIER GRP. (2015), https://uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Who%20Pays%20for%20Roads
%20vUS.pdf. (documenting the extent to which general tax funds are used to pay for highways).
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partially externalize costs (external cure). Further, taxpayers pay this
cure by default (victim presumption). Finally, the cure is performance
based (property-rule); the total cure obligation is whatever emerges as
the ultimate cost of fixing the road.302
c. Internal prevention
All of the cure obligations in the previous section create
incentives that influence internal prevention measures, such as how
and how-often people drive.
For example, under the negligence standard, drivers face cure
obligations if victims prove harms caused by unreasonable driving.
This creates incentives for ex-ante, internal prevention, like driving
with reasonable care.303 However, the negligence regime is not so
onerous as to greatly decrease driving.
If cure obligations are more victim-oriented than the negligence
standard—for example, if cure includes victim presumptions and exante bonding requirements—the increased liability creates incentives
for more extensive ex-ante, internal prevention. Faced with such cure
duties, drivers may both increase precautions and decrease activity
levels.304 So, for example, hazardous material carriers may conduct
more frequent safety checks on equipment, or some commercial
drivers may choose not to carry hazardous materials.
Finally, a broad remedial standard, such as general tax funds for
road repair, is unlikely to incentivize private prevention. Because the
external cure structure spreads costs disproportionately to the causes
of harm, it diminishes incentives for particular harm-causing actors
(such as frequent drivers, drivers of heavy vehicles, or drivers who use
snow-chains) to undertake precautions or decrease behavior.

302. Such costs frequently overrun third-party measurements like bids or estimates. Cf.
Dakshina G. De Silva et al., Project Modifications and Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions
1 (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2015-14, 2015), https://www.frbatlanta.org//media/Documents/research/publications/wp/2015/14.pdf (describing specific difficulties inherent
in highway construction auctions).
303. For careless drivers who have been liable for harms, the experience of having paid
damages may lead to ex-post internal prevention, such as driving with even greater care.
304. Increased liability can make additional precautions cost-effective. Cf. STEARNS ET AL.,
supra note 32, at 74 (describing the relationship between liability, precautions, and costs).
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d. The policy landscape surrounding motorist behavior
The combination of prevention and cure measures addressing
motorist behavior knit together to form a relatively integrated and
reinforcing policy landscape. The various external prevention
measures calibrate different deterrence levels for more- and lessdesirable behaviors. Additionally, the external prevention measures
work in concert with the cure measures. For example, by regulating
speeding and restricting vehicle weight and height, the external
prevention measures reduce residual risk below what might otherwise
be cost-effective under a negligence cure regime. At the same time,
the internal-cure provisions, such as negligence and strict liability,
counteract potentially under-inclusive regulations (external
prevention) by incentivizing tailored internal-prevention measures.
The cure measures also mitigate under-inclusive prevention by
addressing unforeseen or unavoidable harms. Finally, the variety of
complementary cure measures helps balance concerns about over- and
under-inclusive cure. Negligence measures seek to optimally
compensate victims while not over-deterring beneficial driving, strict
liability guarantees victims remedies for injuries from hazardous
activities, and external-cure measures guard against potential underinclusive funding for road repairs.
Thus, the prevention and cure measures governing motorist
behavior form a generally cohesive policy landscape. This does not
immunize each individual measure from criticism, and indeed the
prevention-and-cure framework helps identify potentially problematic
measures and suggest strategies for improvement.305 Nonetheless,
accepting that individual measures are (and will always be) imperfect,
this integrated collection of prevention and cure measures coherently
addresses motorist behavior.
2. Climate Change
In contrast with the congruous policy landscape surrounding
motorist behavior, the individual prevention and cure measures
addressing climate change are largely independent and isolated,
305. For instance, if in practice the negligence standard represents de-facto external cure
because victims are unable to consistently carry their burden of proof, this may counsel adopting
different cure variations, such as victim presumptions, to internalize costs and reinforce internal
prevention.
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limiting the efficacy of each measure and leaving significant gaps in
climate policy. Figure 11 depicts the climate change policy landscape,
and later sections explore the external-prevention, cure, and internalprevention measures aimed at climate change harms. The final section
explains why this assembly of prevention and cure measures remains
disjointed, and it highlights tactics to help integrate climate policy.
Figure 11: Climate Change Policy Landscape
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a. External prevention
Unlike the external prevention measures addressing motorist
behavior, which are common and generally consistent across the
United States, external prevention of climate change is relatively
uncommon and highly inconsistent. Until recently, there were no
external-prevention efforts to avoid climate harms by curbing
greenhouse gas emissions, and currently there remains little external
prevention at the federal level and in many states.306 However, some
states have adopted external-prevention efforts to reduce emissions,
and other jurisdictions may consider implementing such measures.307
306. See Nadel, supra note 259.
307. Id.

(7) 54.4_PAPPAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/18/21 12:45 PM

PREVENTION AND CURE

1145

Examining the prevailing external prevention approaches helps
uncover their different attributes and advantages.
Among external-prevention options, a carbon tax, which requires
greenhouse gas emitters to pay per unit of emission, may be least
restrictive (depending on the price of the tax). A carbon tax represents:
1) ex-ante,
2) liability rule,
3) external prevention, with
4) a victim presumption.
Carbon taxes are government-imposed measures (external
prevention) that regulate greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate future
climate harms (ex-ante).308 They impose a given price for emissions
(liability-rule), and emissions are presumptively subject to the tax
(victim presumption). The higher the carbon-tax price, the more it will
reduce emissions, but a carbon tax itself does not set a total limit on
emissions. Rather, actors can emit as much greenhouse gas as they can
afford.309
No states currently impose carbon tax policies, though
Washington and Massachusetts have considered it.310 Additionally,
the City of Boulder, Colorado as well as two Canadian provinces
employ carbon taxes.311
Potentially more restrictive than a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade
approach employs a property rule rather than a liability rule. A capand-trade policy represents:
1) ex-ante,
2) property-rule,
3) external prevention, with
4) a victim presumption
Like a carbon tax, a cap-and-trade program is a governmentimposed regulation (external prevention) that seeks to avoid future
climate harms (ex-ante), and emissions are presumptively subject to
the cap-and-trade program (victim presumption). However, unlike a
carbon-tax, a cap-and-trade program adopts a property-rule structure
by requiring performance (a cap on total emissions). Thus, while both
308.
309.
310.
311.

See, e.g., U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 126.
See id.
Nadel, supra note 259.
Id.
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cap-and-trade and carbon-tax approaches can theoretically reduce
emissions to the same extent, cap-and-trade programs can do so more
directly. Currently, eleven states employ some version of cap and
trade.312
Other relatively common greenhouse gas emissions reduction
efforts include renewable portfolio standards,313 fuel efficiency
standards,314 and commitments to zero-carbon development.315 These
all impose performance standards on certain emitting sources, so like
cap-and-trade regimes, these measures represent 1) ex-ante, 2)
property rule, 3) external prevention with 4) a victim presumption.
b. Cure
As for cure, there is currently little practical prospect of internal
cure for climate harms, so effectively all climate change cure is
external. The details of the relevant cure configurations help explain
why.

312. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont have active cap and trade systems. Jason Ye,
U.S. State Carbon Pricing Policies, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLS.,
https://www.c2es.org/document/us-state-carbon-pricing-policies/ (last updated June 2020). These
states represent “over a quarter of the U.S. population and account for a third of U.S. GDP.” Id.
Additionally, Virginia has indicated a willingness to join a cap-and-trade program. Sarah Rankin,
Virginia Moves Toward Joining Cap-and-Trade Program, AP NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020), https://apne
ws.com/article/virginia-climate-change-business-ccc455631eee64caf01aff0765c849d4.
313. Renewable portfolio standards require that by a certain future date a given percentage of
electricity sold in the jurisdiction must come from renewable (typically low- or zero-carbon)
sources. See Richard Bowers, Updated Renewable Portfolio Standards Will Lead to More
Renewable Electricity Generation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38492. At least 29 states have adopted some
form of renewable portfolio standard. Id.
314. Fuel efficiency standards aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by requiring that
vehicles sold in future years meet minimum fuel efficiencies (typically minimum miles per gallon).
The federal government imposes some fuel efficiency standards. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY, https://www.nhtsa.gov/lawsregulations/corporate-average-fuel-economy (last visited Apr. 11, 2021).
315. Zero-carbon or “net zero” development goals include municipal commitments that all
buildings in a city will be carbon-neutral by a given date. See, e.g., N.Y.C. COUNCIL, CLIMATE
MOBILIZATION ACT, https://council.nyc.gov/data/green/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2021); Press
Release, New York City Council, Council to Vote on Climate Mobilization Act Ahead of Earth
Day (Apr. 18, 2019), https://council.nyc.gov/press/2019/04/18/1730/ (requiring building retrofits
that will reduce emissions by 80% by 2050).
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Tort liability potentially provides internal cure to address climate
change harms,316 but its actor-presumptive structure has proven a
major barrier for victims seeking remedies. The relevant tort regimes,
such as negligence or nuisance, are typically:
1) ex-post,
2) liability-rule,
3) internal cure, with
4) an actor presumption.
In any context an actor presumption can impede victims’ access
to cure, but in climate change cases, the actor presumption poses a
particularly high hurdle. For example, scientific uncertainty over
causation of climate harms leaves plaintiffs with a daunting burden in
pressing their claims. This makes internal cure for climate harms
practically unavailable.
As a result, external cure is, de facto, the exclusive option for
victims of climate change harms such as floods or wildfires. Victims
may be forced to bear such harms themselves, but in some cases social
insurance is available, such as through flood-insurance or disasterassistance programs. Such programs represent:
1) ex-post,
2) liability-rule,
3) external cure, with
4) an actor presumption.
These programs are funded disproportionally to climate change
causation (external cure), and they respond to harms that have already
occurred (ex-post). Victims must prove that they qualify for the
programs (actor presumption), and if so, they receive some objective
measure of relief (liability-rule).
As an alternative to this ex-post approach, prospective managed
retreat programs potentially provide ex-ante, external cure for some
climate change victims. Because such programs seek to preemptively
relocate vulnerable populations before disastrous climate change
impacts, they represent:
1) ex-ante,
2) liability-rule,
316. However, even bringing a tort claim in this context requires overcoming justiciability
issues, and a number of courts have dismissed such claims on justiciability issues related to
positivism. See supra Section IV.C.2.c.
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3) external cure, with
4) a victim presumption
c. Internal prevention
The limited prospect of internal-cure obligations for climate
change harms offers little meaningful incentive for internal prevention
measures. However, some individuals and organizations still
undertake voluntary internal prevention. For instance, some
individuals perform internal, ex-ante prevention by attempting to
lower their carbon footprints. Similarly, some organizations engage in
ex-ante internal prevention through commitments to lowering
greenhouse gas emissions.
Victims of climate-change-exacerbated harms may also adopt expost, internal prevention, such as by relocating to avoid future climate
harms or by modifying their homes to be more resilient (e.g., raising a
house above flood level). However, the availability of external cure
like disaster assistance or subsidized flood insurance can reduce
incentives for such precautions and encourage victims to remain in
climate-vulnerable areas.317
d. The policy landscape surrounding climate change
The policy landscape surrounding climate change is patchy and
disconnected, hampering its effectiveness. Practically speaking, this is
unsurprising. As evidenced by the hearty climate change denial by
executives and legislators at both the federal and state levels, many
jurisdictions effectively do not consider climate change a harm.318
Thus, there are relatively few prevention or cure measures addressing
climate change, and climate policy may be feeble by design.
Nonetheless, analyzing climate change policy structure helps to
precisely critique its gaps and to inform future efforts at improvement.
External prevention of climate change presents enormous risk of
under-inclusion (or, possibly, over-inclusion, if one believes
emissions reductions are unnecessary). Obviously, the fact that only a
minority of U.S. jurisdictions regulate greenhouse gas emissions
diminishes the likelihood of avoiding climate harms. Moreover, huge
317. See generally Pappas & Flatt, supra note 131 (describing the cycle of repetitive losses in
communities vulnerable to natural disasters and recovery from insurance companies).
318. See supra Part IV.

(7) 54.4_PAPPAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

PREVENTION AND CURE

11/18/21 12:45 PM

1149

knowledge limitations afflict efforts to tailor appropriate greenhouse
gas reduction measures. Further, the potential financial impacts of
greenhouse gas restrictions attract the influence of many powerful
interest groups looking to shape regulations to their advantage.319
The status of climate change cure measures exacerbates these
potential problems. The lack of meaningful internal cure undercuts
incentives for internal prevention, meaning that climate policy wastes
the potential for internal cure to mitigate under-inclusive prevention.
Moreover, the functional absence of internal cure likely causes underinclusive cure by leaving victims without recourse.
While external-cure measures, like disaster assistance or flood
insurance, may seek to help such victims, these programs too are
under-inclusive because not all victims qualify or receive satisfactory
remedies.320 At the same time, these external-cure programs also cause
moral hazard problems that undermine victims’ incentives to adopt
internal prevention. For example, the prospect of disaster assistance
can perpetuate risky development and redevelopment in climatevulnerable areas. While external-prevention measures, such as
regulations limiting such hazardous development, could help
counteract these problems, disaster-assistance and flood-insurance
programs do not effectively incorporate such development
restrictions.321
Finally, climate policy fails to make the most of voluntary internal
prevention efforts. Such internal prevention measures, like diffuse
efforts to reduce carbon footprints, could benefit from greater
coordination via external-prevention guidance.
Because current climate policy does not harness complementary
prevention and cure measures, it ends up being less than the sum of its
parts. It relies on disparate, isolated policies, missing opportunities for
reinforcing measures to either amplify effectiveness or check overand under-inclusive tendencies. In particular, one of the most glaring
gaps is the lack of meaningful internal cure. This aspect of climate
policy severs many complementary links between prevention and

319. For example, political pressure may mean that regulations never restrict greenhouse gas
emissions stringently enough.
320. See generally Pappas & Flatt, supra note 131 (discussing the inadequacies of current
available remedies for climate disasters).
321. Id.
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cure, and providing more potent internal cure represents a key step for
creating more integrated policies. While the irreversible impacts of
climate change may call for a strong dose of prevention, such
prevention would be enhanced by well-matched cure.
CONCLUSION
Prevention and cure are foundational elements of legal
architecture, spanning diverse substantive areas and normative
commitments. A nuanced framework of prevention and cure provides
both overarching theoretical perspectives and specific practical
insights into the structure of law and policy.

